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The recent relapse of bank failures in Kenya has been a cause for concern especially 
after a period of several years of stability in the banking sector. Past studies have 
identified key determinants of financial distress but few studies have established the 
effect of spreads on financial distress. This study therefore sought to establish the 
determinants of financial distress in Kenyan commercial banks. Specifically, the study 
looked at the influence of leverage, overly aggressive activity, insider lending, 
ownership structure, bank size and financial soundness (capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management efficiency, earnings, liquidity and market risk) as bank specific factors. It 
also looked at economic growth, the central bank rate and interbank activity as macro-
economic factors. The study adopted a postpositivistic philosophy and a quantitative 
research design. The methodology employed was panel data. A multivariate regression 
model was used to test the hypotheses and link the variables. The study took on a census 
approach and all forty-three Kenyan commercial banks were taken as the population. 
Secondary data was extracted from the financial statements of all commercial banks and 
Central Bank of Kenya website for the period 2012-2018. The study found that leverage, 
overly aggressive activity, market risk and bank size negatively and significantly 
affected the level of financial distress. Earnings, liquidity and the spread on insider 
lending are found to positively and significantly affect financial distress. Private 
ownership was associated with higher degrees of financial distress. Lastly, macro-
economic factors were found to be poor indicators of the level of financial distress 
explaining less than two percent of the variation in financial distress levels. The study 
recommends that financial ratio analysis be complemented with additional evaluations, 
with extra features such as competitive position, capital structure, regulatory compliance 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The different approaches to the definition of the term financial distress goes to show the 
versatility, complexity, and sometimes even how controversial this economic category 
can be (Outecheva, 2007). As a rule, the term financial distress is used in a negative 
connotation in order to describe the financial situation of a company confronted with a 
temporary lack of liquidity and with the difficulties that ensue in fulfilling financial 
obligations on schedule and to the full extent (Gordon, 1971; Davydenko, 2005). This 
study will adopt the definition in its most basic sense, as a decrease in financial efficacy 
resulting from a cash shortage (Korteweg, 2007). It is a state in which an entity 
generates inadequate revenues because it is not able to meet its financial requirements. 
This is caused by illiquid assets, high levels of fixed costs or earnings which are highly 
sensitive to depressed economic conditions. Disregarding the indications of financial 
distress can be detrimental for a firm as it may lead to bankruptcy. 
Whitaker (1999) identified five central steps in the financial distress process. To start 
with, the firm is unable to make debt payments on time. It may be a passing cash flow 
challenge (technical insolvency) or an enduring problem caused by decrease in asset 
values below debt requirements (insolvency in bankruptcy). Next, a decision is taken as 
to whether the problem is a temporary one or not. If found to be temporary, the firm can 
be given time to recover by reaching an agreement with creditors. However, economic 
losses have already occurred in a case whereby basic long term value of assets has 
decreased. A decision is then taken as to whether the business would be best liquidated 
and sold or if it would be of more value if it were continued and sustained in operation. 





or use informal procedures. Lastly a decision is made as to who should control the firm 
while under liquidation. 
The entire financial system is threatened by problems arising from poor bank 
management. To achieve the goal of effective management of the country’s financial 
system, methods which help financial institutions promptly identify management related 
problems are required. Steps can then be taken to protect not just citizens’ deposits but 
also the whole system (Hunjak, 2001). For example, efforts by Japan to liberalise 
financial institutions in the 1970’s was marked by severe financial disruptions and 
banking problems. What began as a smooth transition spiraled into sharp increase in 
asset prices, monetary growth, and subsequent fall in asset prices in the early 1990’s. 
Financial institutions were left with a massive non - performing loan estimated at US$ 
500 billion leading to the crash of many financial institutions in Japan (Cheserek, 2005). 
The United States faced a significant threat to its financial system in the period between 
1979 to 1987, when more banks had failed in USA compared to the entire previous post-
depression period. In 1988, 171 failed banks were analysed by the OCC in order to 
identify present features and circumstances at the point when the banks worsened. 
Additional 51 rehabilitated banks were also analysed. The rehabilitated banks had 
recovered after undergoing significant challenges. The OCC established that only 10 
percent of the challenged and failed banks did not suffer the impact of management led 
weaknesses. The other 90 percent failed due to management led weaknesses. 
(OCC,1988). 
The ripple effect of contagion to other financial institutions and the economy at large 
during a financial crisis cannot be under estimated. In March 1980, one of the largest 
private banks in Argentine- Banco de Intercambio Regional failed. Days later, the 
Central Bank had to intervene to rescue three other banks, two of which were liquidated. 
This marked the beginning of a serious crisis of the Argentine financial system which 





World Bank, 1984). The banking crisis in Chile took place in the period between 1982-
1984. Poor macro-economic policies and lack of strong regulation cost the Chilean 
economy 30 to 40 percent of GDP. As a result, the country’s GDP dropped by 14 
percent in 1982 and unemployment increased by over 11 percent in in one year. Inflation 
grew from 10 percent in 1982 to 23 percent in 1983. (Sundararajan & Balino, 1991). 
Since the era of the Great Depression, the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 had the 
worst impact. It led to the collapse or nationalization of some of the world’s best-known 
financial institutions. Many others only survived with significant support from the state. 
The crisis affected key financial centers across the world more than any other financial 
crisis post the world war era. (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Within the region, by 1988 Ghana’s formal banking system had about 11 commercial 
banks and 112 rural banks under the supervision of Bank of Ghana. Their first phase of 
financial sector restructuring program began in 1988 and ended in 1991 costing an 
estimated US$300 million or 6% of GDP (Tannar, 1990). 
Locally, the collapse of Continental and Union Bank groups and the Rural-Urban Credit 
Finance in 1984-1986 marked the beginning of bank failures within this period. The 
banks were not able to repay funds obtained from government bodies so they were 
liquidated (Martin, 1998). This led to contagion and as a result other commercial banks 
like Trade bank and Euro bank were liquidated while others like Daima bank were 
placed under statutory management by the Centrak Bank. Others which experienced 
liquidity challenges were merged and formed part of the present Consolidated Bank for 
example Nationwide Finance Company Ltd and the Home Savings and Mortgage 
Company Limited (Wachira, 2010). The economic impact of these failures is yet to be 
established. 
Between August 2015 and April 2017, three commercial banks had failed in Kenya 





depositors flat footed. Many individuals and entities could not access their funds in some 
cases. For three banks to collapse in under one year was a watershed event in modern 
banking history. It showed how quickly the revelation of credit problems at a well-
regarded banking industry could turn into a liquidity problem that threatened the 
survival of the bank itself, and also the survival of the financial system (Ngunjiri, 2016). 
Gilbert, Menon and Schwartz (1990) summarized the three key reasons of financial 
distress as asset mix, financial structure and corporate governance. In a study by 
Wulandari, Musdholifah and Kusairi (2017), meant to evaluate the influence of internal 
and external influences on the Indonesian banking system found that the economic 
growth was the main external factor whilst internal banking factors included capital, 
asset quality, management, and earnings. The study by the OCC (1988) evaluating the 
causes of failure of national banks in the USA, concluded that internal problems 
contributed to the failure of national banks. These included deficiencies within boards 
and management, overly aggressive boards and management, insider abuse and fraud 
whilst external factors included depressed economic conditions. A study by Adeniyi and 
Kenneth (2014) on prediction of bank failures on some selected banks in Nigeria showed 
that bank failures were caused by excessive risk taking and poor camel rating. A survey 
of 21 Kenyan commercial banks by Cheserek (2005) showed that bank failure in the 
period between 1998 - 2005 was determined by asset quality, capital adequacy and total 
assets. Asset quality seemed to be the most critical aspect that affected bank failure.  
A research gap on determinants of financial distress facing Kenyan commercial banks 
after the recent relapse of bank failures is evident from the limited number of local 
studies on the subject.  Mamo (2011) tested the applicability of the Altman (1968) model 
in predicting financial distress in Kenyan commercial banks but did not consider 
determinants of financial distress. Taliani (2010) came up with a model predicting 
financial distress in Kenyan commercial banks. His study covered the period 1990 to 
2009. The model has not been tested on failures post 2009. Cheserek (2005) studied the 





not include the recent bank failures and new macro-economic enviroment. Ochieng 
(2018) studied the factors contributing to financial distress in Kenyan commercial banks 
using content analysis. His study did not include any data analysis. Waweru and Kalani 
(2009) used primary data to study commercial banking crises in Kenya: causes and 
remedies. No secondary data was employed. Gathaiya (2017) used content analysis to 
diagnose problems affecting collapsed Kenyan banks between the year 2015-2016. His 
study did not include any data analysis. This study specifically targets determinants of 
financial distress in the banking sector by analyzing secondary data from all the 
commercial banks for the period under study. The study drilled down further on the bank 
specific factors to establish if the spreads between actual ratios and regulatory ratios 
have a significant influence on financial distress. Where regulatory ratios did not exist, 
market average rates applied. This is to enhance new knowledge in a diverse 
environment. 
1.2 Problem Definition 
At the start of the decade, the banking sector was going through a very good season with 
PBT growing at an average of 18% year on year from the year 2010 to 2014 (CBK, 
2010-2014). However, from the year 2015 the banking sector commenced a rollercoaster 
ride. The banking sector experienced a negative 5% year on year growth in PBT (CBK 
2015). It then barely recovered to its previous profit levels in the year 2016 with a 10% 
year on year growth in PBT. It then dipped again in the year 2017 with a negative 10% 
year on year growth in PBT (CBK 2016-2017). The banking sector then made a 
comeback in the year 2018 with 14% year on year growth in PBT (CBK 2018). 
However, this does not compare to its 18% average annual growth levels in PBT 
experienced at the beginning of the decade. 
This raises concerns as to what transpired in the years 2015 and 2017 when the banking 
sector experienced 5% and 10% profitability dips respectively which it is yet to fully 





three months later, Imperial Bank was also put under receivership (CBK, 2015). In April 
2016, Chase Bank was also put under receivership (CBK, 2016). In September 2016, the 
sector was subjected to an interest rate capping law, which sets the maximum lending 
rate at no more than four per cent above the Central Bank base rate and the minimum 
interest rate granted on a deposit held in interest earning accounts with commercial 
banks to at least seventy per cent of the same rate (CBK, 2018). The full annual impact 
of that law was to be experienced in 2017. In May 2017, Fidelity bank was acquired by 
SBM holdings for only one dollar (The Standard, 2017).  
As illustrated, because of the fragility and interconnectedness of banking institutions, the 
failure of a bank is a great concern (Kaufman, 2009). Contagion can quickly spread 
throughout the economy through spillover effects.  This can not only result in the failure 
of other banks but also the economy at large. This study seeks to assess the effect of 
both bank specific and macro-economic factors on the level of financial distress in 
Kenyan commercial banks. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This research seeks to predict financial distress in Kenyan commercial banks. 
Specifically: 
1. To assess the level of financial distress in Kenyan commercial banks. 
2. To assess effect of bank specific factors on the level of financial distress in 
Kenyan commercial banks. 
3. To assess effect of macro-economic factors on the level of financial distress 
in Kenyan commercial banks. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following questions: 





2. What is the effect of bank specific factors on the level of financial distress in 
Kenyan commercial banks? 
3. What is the effect of macro-economic factors on the level of financial distress in 
Kenyan commercial banks? 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This study focused on all commercial banks and mortgage finance companies between 
the years 2012 and 2018. This period covers a full economic cycle which typically falls 
within two election periods. It is also the period within which three banks have failed in 
the recent past. The years 2017 and 2018 are also of interest as they are the years when 
the full annual impact of the interest rate capping law was experienced by banks. The 
study is capped at 2018 due to availability of data. The study excluded the banks in 
receivership, banks under statutory management and banks in transition to be acquired in 
the respective years when these actions took place due to unavailability of data from that 
point going forward. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The study results will be beneficial to the following stakeholders: 
Regulators: The study will be beneficial to the Central Bank of Kenya and other policy 
makers who are tasked with monitoring and ensuring stability in the economy. They will 
take proactive measures to detect and minimize the impact of financial distress to 
depositors and the economy at large. They will draft policies that will help in improving 
the mode of operation in the banking sector and keep the commercial banks accountable 
with regard to managing their levels of financial distress. They will also assist in 
ensuring veracity of financial information on commercial banks so that accurate and 





Senior management of commercial banks: Since they continuously seek the best mode 
of operation to ensure that commercial banks remain a going concern, the study findings 
will be beneficial to senior management of commercial banks in ensuring that they steer 
their organizations in the right direction and take corrective action in a timely manner. 
They will take proactive measures to quantify and monitor their levels of financial 
distress and take timely remedial actions where necessary. 
Scholars and Academicians: Scholars and academicians will find areas with the potential 
for further research while also contributing to new knowledge. They will find areas 
where they can provide additional support structures to minimize the level of financial 





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes financial distress theories and how they influence commercial 
banks. It also presents literature by other scholars and formulates study hypothesis with 
regard to financial distress on commercial banks.   
2.2 Theoretical Review 
Theoretical framework is the edifice that describes and identifies the key theories that 
organize a study (Smith, 2004). It is utilized in understanding, laying hypothesis, or in 
giving meaning to the relationships among the elements that impact, influence, or 
forecast the outcomes of events specified (Kombo & Tromp, 2009). Theories discussed 
herein include: Lender of last resort theory, market power theory and portfolio theory. 
2.2.1 Lender of Last Resort Theory 
The theory of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) says that large welfare benefits accrue 
by lending to illiquid (but solvent) banks, during a financial crisis. Thornton (1802) and 
Bagehot (1873), were among the first to evaluate the function of the LOLR. Their 
evaluation if founded on the assumption that financial crises are caused by market 
failures. Such market failures include threat of bank runs and information asymmetries 
which prevent the ideal capital allocation. Consequently, banks need to sell assets at fire-
sale discounts to secure funding during such crises. This snow balls into depletion of 
bank capital, reduction in financing for the real economy, finally resulting in a credit 
crunch and the likelihood of inefficient bank liquidations. As suggested by the LOLR 
theory, the central bank, by providing funding to banks, can tackle this market failure. 
By doing so, this will ease the credit crunch and avoid inefficient liquidations 





Two explanations within the LOLR theory highlight the motivation for take up of LOLR 
lending. These are the illiquidity theory and the risk-shifting theory. The illiquidity 
theory says that market failures cause banks to suffer from an inability to roll over 
financing of assets. For example, in a panic-induced run on a bank’s deposits, banks 
suffering from such illiquidity would be forced to sell off some of their asset holdings if 
LOLR assistance was inaccessible. The urgency to sell off assets could result to fire 
sales and the erosion of bank equity, resulting to a credit crunch. By providing such 
banks with financing for their existing assets through LOLR support, it allows them to 
avoid fire sales and slowly de-leverage (Drechsler et.al., 2013).  
The risk-shifting theory says that, some banks use LOLR haircut subsidies to raise their 
risk taking, due to risk-shifting motivations. The theory explains that, financially-weaker 
banks or weakly-capitalized banks experiencing a crisis-induced decline in bank asset 
values, may be motivated to increase their risk taking using LOLR loans. This is due to 
the high probability of default. The reason for this is that, as the collateral value 
decreases, and the borrowing bank defaults, the LOLR would bear some of the loss as 
well. This is because haircut-subsidized loans are under collateralized. Hence high 
haircut-subsidy assets represent a risk to the LOLR as they are left to bear some of the 
down risk whilst the weakly-capitalized bank obtains the upside (Drechsler et.al., 2013). 
In contrast, as the rate of interest on Central Bank LOLR loans is generally higher than 
that charged in the interbank repo markets, well-capitalized banks would not view such 
loans as having a positive net benefit, hence are unlikely to default. 
This theory applied during the Great Depression. The motivation for correspondent 
banks to monitor and manage interbank liquidity risk by holding higher levels of capital 
or assets in liquid form was weakened when the Fed was founded. This was because 
institution of the Fed gave a perception of liquidity risk protection against the jolts 
related to banking panics in the National Banking era. Ultimately, the Fed failed to 





did not fulfill the expectations of banks that the Fed would insure them against liquidity 
risk shocks (Calomiris, Jaremski and Wheelock (2019),  
Onset of distress of other firms can be caused by a default of one firm. This is especially 
the case whereby firms hold significant liabilities of the defaulting firm. For example, in 
the recent financial crisis, banks sought to limit their interbank exposures by dumping 
various classes of assets, which magnified price declines. As the interbank lending 
market collapsed in September 2008, banks scrambled to hoard reserves as a means of 
self-insurance against prospective liquidity needs, which aggravated declines in risky 
asset prices (Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen 2015). 
This theory applies to this study as the Central Bank of Kenya was criticized being 
LOLR, for failing to provide sufficient liquidity to Chase Bank when it faced a run on its 
deposits (Abdulla, 2018). Many of the banks holding significant liabilities in Chase 
Bank sought to limit their interbank exposures by closing all correspondent relationships 
with banks they considered high risk. Also the erosion of the perception of the Central 
Bank as the liquidity risk insurer led to a significant reduction in interbank activity 
(CBK, 2017). The illiquidity theory kicked into play as some of the distressed banks 
became chronically dependent on the LOLR lending. 
2.2.2 Market Power Theory 
Market power theory was discovered in the late 1980s because of banks developing 
interest and studies on performance. It begun with the utilization of the Market Power 
and Efficiency Structure theories. These two theories were industrial setup models 
(Athanasoglou, Delis & Brissimis, 2008). These researches gave key reference to the 
connection between earnings of banks and how the market is structured.  Olweny and 
Shipho (2011) opine that Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) and the Relative Market 





As a theory, SCP is described as the connection between firm conduct, how the market 
is structured and entity performance. Conduct denotes features such as the advertising 
choices, pricing choices and R&D choices made by entities in a market (Baye, 2010). 
The manner in which an industry is structured could include market conditions, 
concentration in terms of number of players and technology; whilst the performance of a 
firm is the social welfare and earnings. Athanasoglou et al. (2008) proposes that under 
this situation greater market power earns supernormal profits. Similarly, Olweny and 
Shipho (2011) supports that higher profits can result from bank market power resulting 
from concentration in the banking market.   
Berger (1995), states that a firm’s profitability is subject to inhibitors to entry into an 
industry. In such case, new entrants shrink the profits as increased penetration costs 
assist current firms maintain supernormal profits. Hence, market concentration leads to 
higher profits, as it slows collusion costs amongst existing banks. Olweny and Shipho 
(2011) observe that markets with less players, that is, concentrated; banks can end up 
making abnormal profits, despite their efficiency levels, compared to banks operating in 
markets with more players. This is because banks in markets with few players can 
charge higher rates on their loans through collusion, while sustaining lower costs of 
funds on their deposits.  
According to Olweny & Shipho (2011) the RMP hypothesis notes that earnings and 
profitability of banks is determined by market share. RMP proposes the need for only 
sizeable banks with unique products be able to grow their profits by controlling prices. 
These banks would be in a position to exercise market power and acquire monopoly 
profits while institutions with lesser share of the market operate like those under perfect 
competition and hence cannot earn the same monopoly profits. 
Large Kenyan banks have consistently commanded well over 50% of the sector’s market 
share (CBK 2010-2017). Therefore, banks are taking all sorts of measures to enable 





by the RMP hypothesis that notes that bank profitability is determined by market share. 
The RMP hypothesis also proposes that only large banks with differentiated products be 
able to control prices and grow their profits. In an interest rate cap regime, only banks 
with differentiated products would be able to control prices and grow their profits. To 
this end, banks are undertaking a wide range new investments to grow their volumes or 
venture into products whose pricing can be delinked from the interest rate cap pricing. 
This competition has seen Kenyan commercial banks open branches extensively, venture 
into mobile lending platforms and expand into other investments like subsidiaries, 
associates or joint ventures. 
2.2.3 Portfolio Theory 
In the works of Atemnkeng and Nzongang (2006), a relevant approach known as 
balanced portfolio theory is identified. The theory on balanced Portfolio observes that 
the contents of a bank portfolio, as well as its earnings and shareholder’s return are 
because of policy decisions. Ongore and Kusa (2013), argue that these can be influenced 
by many aspects like the size of the portfolio, the cumulative yield of the portfolio and 
the risks exposures on the assets.  
Decisions by the bank management determine the preferred composition of the portfolio 
of commercial banks and the portfolio diversification. Atemnkeng and Nzongang (2006) 
stresses that the balance sheet composition is chosen by senior bank management. In 
addition, the firm’s ability to earn high profits will be influenced by the cost per unit 
sustained to make each component of the assets. 
Sinkey (1975) showed characteristic of problem banks. Sinkey (1975) suggested various 
factors, both financial and operational, could be helpful in checking the financial health 
of a bank and diagnose its main problems. Hayden, Porath & von Westernhagen (2006) 
established diverging evidence in their research which assessed portfolio diversification 





of 983 German banks across broader economic sectors, different industries, and 
geographical regions. The findings show that no significant performance benefits 
accrued because of diversification.  It was observed that each type of diversification 
tended to reduce the banks’ returns. It was also established that the impact of 
diversification depended strongly on the level of risk. The Portfolio theory asserts that 
banks’ financial performance is pegged on internal efficiencies and management 
decisions (Olweny & Shipho, 2011). 
According to the banking supervision reports by CBK, the ratio of gross non-performing 
loans to gross loans consistently declined from highs of over 30% in the early 2000’s to 
its lowest point of 4.4% in the year 2011 (CBK 2003 – 2011). However, the benefits of 
this low level of non-performing loans were short lived as the ratio begun a gentle but 
constant climb to hit double digit in the year 2017 and to super 12% levels as at the year 
2018 (CBK 2012 – 2018). This shows that the Kenyan commercial banks have adopted 
higher risk in their loan portfolios as the rate of return on these loans had been market 
determined until the year 2016 when the interest rate capping law was introduced. 
2.3 Empirical Review 
The empirical review covers the measures of financial distress and hypothesis 
formulation on the bank specific factors and the macro-economic factors. 
2.3.1 Measures of Financial Distress 
As per Hunjak & Jakovčević (2001), evaluation of financial ratios was the traditional 
mode for bank performance analysis. Nonetheless, in spite of the number of ratios 
utilised, a model that would fully satisfy the needs of bank analysis and evaluation is yet 
to be developed. Hence, financial ratio evaluation is coupled with different quality 





Beaver (1966) initiated the use of a univariate discriminate analysis model on several 
financial ratios on a coupled sample of both failing and non-failing companies to 
forecast bankruptcy. In a bid to select those ratios that best categorized the companies as 
failing or non-failing, Beaver (1966) applied a dichotomous classification test. This was 
to enable him choose the financial ratios that would finally comprise his univariate 
model. The value for each ratio or measure was analyzed independently and with regard 
to the respective ideal cut off point of the measure. Firms were then categorized as non-
failing or failing. If the ratio fell below the cutoff point, it was categorised as failing and 
vice versa. Beaver suggested that the cash flow/total debt ratio was the best with an 
accuracy of 87 percent.  
This model assumed a linear relationship between all measures and the failure status. 
This is one of the limitations of this analysis as it does not always hold in practice. Many 
ratios show a nonlinear relationship with the failure status as a result. Thus, the 
univariate modeling technique is often applied in an inappropriate way and conclusions 
may be questionable (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2004). Another limitation of the univariate 
model is the inconsistency problem. Whereby, a company can be categorised as failed 
on the basis of one ratio and then categorised as non-failed on the basis of a separate 
ratio. This is not realistic as the nature of a company is dynamic and complex and cannot 
be analyzed using one ratio (Argyrou, 2006). A major advantage of this model is that it 
is extremely simple and requires no statistical knowledge. 
To overcome some of the limitations of the univariate model, Altman (1968) initiated 
the application of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) method to the financial 
distress prediction space. Altman adopted the use of 33 distressed companies and 33 
solvent companies. These companies used a Z-score bankruptcy prediction model. They 
also established a cut-off point of Z-score (2.675) to categorise distressed and healthy 
companies. The findings established that the Z-score model could soundly predict 
financial distress in the first and second years prior to the onset of financial distress. 





onset of financial distress (Altman et.al, 2014). In an international study by Altman et al. 
(2016), the general Z-Score model yielded a prediction accuracy of 75% which further 
improved to well above 90% by using estimations specific to a country that incorporated 
extra variables.  
MDA is a technique that allows for the distinction between two or more collection or 
group of items with regard to several factors. For this particular case, it is to distinguish 
between failing and non-failing firms with regard to financial distress. Altman’s Z-score 
pooled various measures of risk or profitability. Using key features which best 
differentiate between the groups, MDA then tries to develop a quadratic or linear 
combination of these features. This model employs five financial ratios which are 
weighted so as to maximize the predictive power of the model. A Z score or zeta model 
which is an overall discriminate score is then produced by the model. A model that 
demonstrates a company’s risk of bankruptcy relative to a standard, is the result. 
(Altman et.al, 2014). 
The Z-score is not without limitations. The Z-Score is not protected from untruthful 
practices of accounting. It is also not applicable to new companies with minimal or nil 
earnings as they will score low regardless of their financial health. The Z-Score only 
hints at the issue of cash flow through the utilisation of net working capital-to-asset 
ratio. It however does not address the cash flow issue directly. Lastly, when a company 
records one-time write offs, the Z-Scores can fluctuate quarter on quarter. This can 
worsen the score when it is not actually the case (Shaefer, 1982). 
Most recently, studies have employed artificially intelligent Expert System Models. 
These models adopt the use of computers in the sense that they are able to show the 
intelligent behavior of human cognitive activities such as problem solving. They are 
referred to as artificial intelligence because their intelligence is contained not in human 
brains but in machines. They include recursive partitioned decision trees where data is 





tree which gives for the initial set, a final decision tree. The most important decision is 
selecting the variable on which to make the next split. The best splitting rule is the one 
that minimises the increase in the sum of the impurities. The extent to which a node 
comprises of training cases from multiple classes, comprising the impurities. This is also 
known as inductive learning model where the process of generalization is used. In a 
situation of case-based reasoning which also happens to be a type of artificially 
intelligent expert model, challenges are solved with the aid of previously solved cases 
(Aziz and Dar, 2004). 
This study employed the Altman’s Z-Score as a measure of financial distress. This is 
because it has been tested for applicability by Mamo (2011) for financial distress in 
Kenyan commercial banks and results showed 80% validity for failed banks and 90% 
validity for non-failed banks (Mamo, 2011). 
2.3.2 Hypothesis Formulation 
The section will cover formulation of the study hypothesis. 
2.3.2.1 Bank specific factors that influence financial distress 
Bank specific factors that influence financial distress include leverage, overly aggressive 
activity, insider lending, ownership structure, bank size and financial soundness. 
2.3.2.1.1 Leverage 
A study by Ebaid (2009) regarding the impact of borrowed capital on financial distress 
of firms listed in Egypt, showed that debt use had insignificant influence on the financial 
distress of entities. This finding was inconsistent with similar studies carried out by 
Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans (2000) and Hadlock and James (2002). Their results showed 





Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) in their study on capital structure and firm 
performance revealed that leverage had a positive influence on financial performance. 
Studies by Abu-Rub (2012) on capital structure and firm performance concurred with 
those of Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) and showed that leverage had a positive 
influence on ROE. However, this studies did not zero-in on financial distress. 
 Muigai (2016) researched the impact of capital structure on financial distress of non-
financial companies listed in Nairobi securities exchange. The findings showed that 
asset tangibility, financial leverage and external equity had a negative significant 
influence on financial distress of non-financial firms. This contrasted studies by Hadlock 
and James (2002) and Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans (2000) above. However, Muigai (2016) 
concurred with Masdupi, Tasman & Davista (2018) whose study on the effect of 
leverage, liquidity and profitability on financial distress of listed manufacturing 
companies in Indonesia, found that leverage has a significant and negative influence on 
financial distress of manufacturing companies.  
The study by Muigai and Muriithi (2017) on the moderating effect of entity size on the 
relationship between capital structure and financial distress of non-financial companies 
listed in Kenya, partially agreed with Masdupi, Tasman & Davista (2018) and Muigai 
(2016). The study showed that debt normally had a significant and negative effect on 
financial distress of the entities under study. However, this significant and negative 
effect becomes significant and positive as the entity grows in size.  
H1: Leverage significantly influences financial distress of Kenyan commercial banks 
2.3.2.1.2 Overly Aggressive Activity 
In a study by the OCC (1988) evaluating the aspects causing the failure of national 
banks, overly aggressive activity exhibited by the governance and or bank management 
was listed as one of the main factors. They defined very aggressive activity as exercising 





A go-getter approach combined with policies and controls that are well laid out can be a 
disruptive strategy. This is because growth-minded, aggressive outlook and manner of 
acting is not a bad thing. What was found to be the problem, was excessive growth 
minded and liberal behavior given the bank specific conditions. 80 percent of the failed 
banks had a governance and/or senior management with an aggressive approach with 
respect to the bank conditions. In addition, the governance was aggressive in such 
manner that had a negative significant influence on the performance of 42 percent of the 
failed banks. The operating and lending processes of most of the failed banks also 
depicted issues like inappropriate lending policies, inadequate or inefficient control 
systems, undue reliance on volatile liabilities, inadequate liquid assets as a second 
source of liquidity, excessive loan growth in relation to staff capacity and insufficient 
deposit, capital or debt funding (OCC, 1988). 
Another study by Basu (2003) agrees with the OCC (1988) findings. The level of credit 
risk that banks undertake to a great extent depends upon the competitive structure under 
which they operate. However, it may also reflect their preference for incurring 
uncertainty and risk. The level of competition defines the competitive structure. The 
intensity of the competitive structure mainly depends upon the number of entities 
operating in the market. These entities compete fiercely with each other to retain or 
extend their share of the market. It goes to say, the more the entities the more intense the 
competition among these institutions to attract more depositors and borrowers.  
Competition amongst the Kenyan commercial banks has seen banks open branches 
extensively, venture into mobile lending platforms and expand into other investments 
like subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures. Some banks have ventured into these 
investments without the appropriate supporting policies, funding structures and 
operating resources, leading them into financial distress. 
In the study by the OCC (1988), overly aggressive behavior was nearly nonexistent in 





challenges in relation to overly aggressive behavior. Further evidencing that overly 
aggressive behavior was a key factor influencing to the failure of banks. 
H2: Overly aggressive activity significantly influences financial distress of Kenyan 
commercial banks 
2.3.2.1.3 Insider Lending 
According to a 1995 Central Bank report, many of the local larger bank failures in the 
1990’s was a product of extensive insider lending. This then became the largest cause of 
bad loans for most of these banks. In more than 50 percent of the failed banks, insider 
loans contributed to a significant share of non-performing loans. Issue of moral 
degradation were particularly chronic in these failed banks as suggested by the high 
levels of insider lending abuse (CBK, 1995). 
The study by OCC (1988), found a positive correlation between insider abuse and failed 
banks. Insider abuse as indicated by inappropriate transactions with affiliates, 
unnecessary dependence on the bank for income or services by a board member or 
shareholder, unauthorized transactions by management officials, or self-dealing was 
evident in many of the problem banks during their decline. This led to the failure of 35 
percent of the banks. 
Another indicator like excessive concentration of ownership, was closely connected with 
insider lending. In the report by CBK (1995), it stated that in many of the problem 
banks, majority shareholding belonged to one family or man. Hence in operational 
decisions, managers faced undue influence by owners. Asserting similar conclusions 
drawn by the OCC (1988) study. Conditions such as a dominant decision maker, 
inadequate supervision of key officers amongst others highlighted presence of insider 
abuse in failed banks (OCC,1988). According to CBK (2013), an institution shall not in 
Kenya, grant or permit to be outstanding advances or credit facilities or give any 





associates and the persons listed as insiders, amounting in the aggregate to more than 
one hundred per cent of the core capital of the institution. 
H3: Insider lending significantly influences financial distress of Kenyan commercial 
banks 
2.3.2.1.4 Ownership structure  
Li, Wang and Deng (2008) carried out a research that targeted listed companies in 
China. The study objectives were to assess the influence of government ownership of 
companies among other variables on financial distress. This study used data that was in 
the public domain from annual financial reports of the companies. The sample selected 
404 finance distressed and a matching sample of 404 non-distressed firms in the Chinese 
securities markets. Data utilized in the study covered the period between 1998 and 2005 
financial years. The study utilized binary logistic analysis. The results indicated that 
state ownership is negatively related with financial distress.  
This results differ with those of Al-Khouri (2012) whose study on banks in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) zone assessed influence of ownership by government and 
risk-taking attitudes on financial distress of the banks. The research utilized the fixed 
effect regression model to quantify the effect of government ownership on financial 
distress and risk taking. The study established that proportion of government ownership 
reduced risk taking attitude of banks and hence reduced the risk of financial distress. 
Banks that had a high proportion of private and institutional ownership were riskier than 
those with high government ownership. Li, Wang and Deng (2008) also differs with Hu 
and Zheng (2015) who tested whether ownership structure has any influence on the 
degree of corporate financial distress in China. The study estimated the degree of 
corporate financial distress for a sample of 378 firms listed in China. These were firms 





study established that government ownership helped firms decrease their degree of 
corporate financial distress. 
Md-Rus, Mohd, Latif and Alassan (2013) conducted a study in Malaysia that examined 
the influence of ownership structure on financial distress of entities. It zeroed in on firms 
that were listed in Malaysian Main Bursa exchange. Distressed firms were considered to 
be those that had shareholders’ equity that was less than 25% of the allotted and paid-up 
capital of a company. The study period was 2004 to 2009. A firm needed to meet the 
distress criterion during this period to be identified as a distressed firm. Findings 
indicated that government ownership was not a significant factor in influencing financial 
distress of the firms under analysis. This contrasted the findings of Li, Wang and Deng 
(2008), Hu and Zheng (2015) and Al-Khouri (2012). 
H4: Ownership structure significantly influences financial distress of Kenyan 
commercial banks 
2.3.2.1.5 Bank Size 
The concept of economies of scale and the traditional neoclassical view of the firm are 
the key theoretical foundation for debating that entity size is connected to financial 
distress (Muigai & Muriithi, 2017). Big entities negotiate for better rebates, discounts or 
interest rates due to the large quantity that they buy, and hence accrue the benefits of 
economies of scale. In addition, lower unit fixed costs per produced unit, division of 
labor and specialization give rise to the same economies (Papadogonas, 2006). It is 
because of these concepts that Papadogonas (2006) hypothesised that large firms tend to 
be financially robust. 
 In contrast, a differing conceptual framework exists whereby a negative influence of 
entity size on corporate financial distress is hypothesised (Muigai & Muriithi, 2017). 





some managers, interested in pursuing selfish goals with total disregard to the profit 
maximization objective of the firm, take control of large firms. 
Dittmar (2004) and Gonenc (2005) found that sizeable entities may experience the 
negative effects of overleveraging if they get into the habit of issuing more debt. This 
may contribute to these large firms experiencing financial distress. Maina and Ishmail 
(2014) and Khan (2012) also supported this position. The findings of their studies 
showed entity size had a negative influence on entity value. The authors argued that 
large firms experience dismal financial performance because of inefficient operations. 
The study by Muigai and Muriithi (2017) showed that debt had a negative and 
significant influence on financial distress of the entities under study. However, as the 
entity grows in size, this influence becomes positive and significant. Hence partially 
agreeing with Khan (2012), Gonenc (2005), Dittmar (2004) and Maina and Ishmail 
(2014) 
H5: Bank size significantly influences financial distress of Kenyan commercial banks 
2.3.2.1.6 Financial Soundness 
Financial soundness indicators show the current financial health and soundness of the 
entire sector of financial institutions in a country. The core set of financial soundness 
indicators include earnings and profitability, sensitivity to market risk, assets quality, 
capital adequacy and, liquidity (IMF, 2017). Bank for International Settlements states 
that management efficiency and operational risk has always been a primary aspect of a 
bank’s risk management program (BIS, 2011). As management efficiency and 
operational risk also form part of CBK’s supervisory model (CBK, 2017), it was also 
included in this study. 
Therefore, this study used the following indicators for financial soundness capital 
adequacy, assets quality, management efficiency and operational risk, earnings and 





2.3.2.1.6.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Capital adequacy is the core ability of the bank to undertake shocks when undergoing a 
crisis. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is the ratio that is set by the regulatory authority in 
the banking sector. The ratio has compulsory conditions imposed by the Central bank 
(Myers & Brealey, 2003). The Capital Adequacy Ratio ratio can be used to analyse the 
condition of a bank.  
Sangmi and Nazir (2010) in their study findings revealed that capital adequacy ratio had 
a positive influence on the earnings and profitability of banks. Shahatit (2011) differed 
with Suka (2012) and Sangmi and Nazir (2010) in the research on the effects of applying 
capital adequacy standard by commercial banks on their profitability. Study findings 
revealed that capital adequacy had little influence on profitability of commercial banks 
in Jordan. Suka (2012) who agreed with Sangmi and Nazir (2010) studied the influence 
of capital adequacy on the financial performance of commercial banks quoted at the 
NSE. The study showed that capital adequacy had an influence on the profitability of the 
banks and further that, capital adequacy contributes positively to the profitability of 
commercial banks. A study conducted by Al-Tamimi (2013) on commercial banks’ 
capital adequacy in Jordan found that there was a negative non-significant relationship 
between capital adequacy ratio and capital risk. These research studies did not however 
zero in on financial distress. 
According to the study findings of Rahman et al. (2004), operating efficiency, interest 
income/interest expense and capital adequacy are reliable financial indicators that can be 
used to detect problems within banks. In addition, capital adequacy indicated financial 
reserve levels. According to CBK (2013), every institution shall at all times maintain the 
minimum core capital to risk weighted assets and total capital to risk weighted assets 






2.3.2.1.6.2 Credit Risk & Asset Quality 
The risk that the lender could lose both the principal and interest on a loan due to default 
by a borrower is termed as credit risk. In the OCC (1988) study, poor asset quality 
continued to be the key reason for deterioration for problem banks. The poor asset 
quality eroded the bank's earnings and finally its capital. Manifestations of credit risk as 
described by the OCC (1988) research include unwarranted concentrations of credit to 
one industry, insufficient cash flow analysis, over lending as depicted by high loan 
amounts relative to debt service ability of the borrower, inappropriate lending policies, 
decisions made by one dominant individual, inadequate problem loan identification 
systems, inadequate controls or supervision of key bank officers or departments and 
lastly nonexistent or poorly followed loan policies. 
Mutua (2015), established that credit risk management had a significant influence on 
bank performance. Credit risk management was defined as the process of risk 
identification, credit sanctions and risk monitoring. His study agrees with Kargi (2011), 
whose findings concluded that credit risk management had a significant influence on 
profitability of Nigeria banks. They further showed the connection between credit risk 
management and financial distress. When large credit risk exposures exist, performance 
declines resulting in financial distress. Nyong’o (2014) concurred with Mutua (2015) in 
that, senior management develop policies and procedures for credit risk management. 
Also, most banks had a solid credit risk management system. However, the angle of 
financial distress was not tackled in connection to credit risk management. 
Musyoki and Kadubo (2012) found that credit risks variables had a negative influence 
on banks’ financial performance. They however did not show the connection between 
financial distress and credit risk. A study by Chimkono, Muturi and Njeru (2016), 
revealed that cost efficiency ratios, average lending interest rate and non-performing 
loan ratio had a significant influence on the performance of banks in Malawi. It however 





2.3.2.1.6.3 Management Efficiency and Operational Risks  
Operational risk is defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as the risk 
of loss ensuing from failed or inadequate systems or external events, people and internal 
processes. According to the OCC (1988) study, manifestations of lack of management 
efficiency and exposures to operational risks include inadequate controls or supervision 
of key bank officers or departments, poor monitoring of operations to ensure adequate 
internal controls and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, lack of competent 
management and decisions made by one dominant individual. 
Nyaga, (2017) concluded that quality management principles had a significant 
relationship with operational risk management. He further noted that implementation of 
quality management principles was weak across Kenyan banks and thus explaining why 
banks were being affected negatively by operational failures and provided poor customer 
service. He however did not show how poor quality management and operational risk 
management could lead to financial distress. 
The study by OCC (1988) concurs with Nyaga (2017) in that, in their study, the OCC 
found that problematic banks lacked systems, controls and policies to guide their 
employees (OCC, 1988). Implementation of quality management principles would help 
banks in achieving effectiveness and efficiency in operations management and prevent 
bank failures. 
2.3.2.1.6.4 Earnings and Profitability 
According to Prasad & Ravinder (2012), earnings quality is a key indicator on the 
bank’s capacity to earn consistently. Aspal and Sanjeev (2014) acknowledge that high 
earnings quality is a reliable measure of future operating status and ought to mirror the 
organization’s current operating performance. Earnings and profitability are perceived as 
the most well-thought-out measures in an entity’s financial statements (Aspal & 





Both the earnings and profitability are the major source of upsurge in capital base. In 
addition, it serves in helping present as well as in future endeavours of the entity. 
Pointers of earnings and profitability include among others; Interest Income to Total 
Assets Ratio, Return on Earnings (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA), The most 
significant pointer adopted in measuring earning is the Return on Assets (ROA) (Reddy, 
2012). Dang (2011) observes that public confidence in a bank is constructed by 
consistent profit. A study by Masdupi, Tasman & Davista (2018) found that profitability 
has a negative and significant influence on financial distress. A study by Ugoani (2015) 
concurs with Masdupi, Tasman & Davista (2018). Empirical evidence suggested that 
nonperforming loans had adverse effects on bank profitability that often lead to bank 
failures. 
2.3.2.1.6.5 Liquidity 
The capability of an asset to be quickly changed into cash at minimal cost is what is 
termed as a firm’s liquidity. (Brealey et.al., 2000). Andualem (2016) opines that entities 
with high liquidity levels are less likely to experience financial distress. The liquidity of 
a firm is an important determinant of financial distress. It is believed that an entity 
struggling financially, will take various salvation actions, such as improving the assets 
liquidity through business retrenchment (Change, 2006). According to the research by 
the OCC (1988), manifestations of liquidity related problems included nonexistent or 
poorly followed asset and liability management policies, undue reliance on volatile 
liabilities and inadequate liquid assets. 
Outecheva (2007) and Kariuki (2013) assert that financial distress in banks is caused by 
high leverage, negative cash flow and very low liquidity. The study by Kariuki (2013) 
found out that most of the banks under study suffered financial distress and that listed 
banks had an edge over non-listed banks. The study also showed that a rise in financial 





distress had a significant negative effect on financial performance of banks. However, 
the liquidity edge of listed banks was not elaborated. 
Gruszczynski (2004), in his study showed size of debt, profitability and liquidity are 
factors that influence financial distress in Poland. Likewise, a study done by Ouma 
(2015) on the effect of liquidity risk on the profitability of commercial banks in Kenya, 
envisaged that liquidity influenced profitability of commercial banks positively. These 
studies did not however link profitability with financial distress.  
A study by Liyuqi (2007) in the United Kingdom, showed that credit risk and liquidity 
have negative influence on bank’s profitability. Crowe (2009) notes that a bank’s 
standing is not stable if it is not maintaining adequate liquidity even if it is having strong 
earnings, sufficient capital and good asset quality. Said and Tumin (2011) agrees with 
Liyuqi (2007), and considers liquidity risk as a key fundamental aspect of bank 
profitability. A study by Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) shows that credit risk and 
liquidity risk both influence a banks chances of default. This current study however goes 
a step further to determine the connection between liquidity and financial distress. 
Alshatti (2014) carried out a study which showed there was a negative effect of the 
liquid assets ratio on the profitability of the Jordanian commercial banks. The study 
differed from the current study in that they operate under different market conditions and 
the connection between profitability and financial distress is not explained. A study by 
Masdupi, Tasman & Davista (2018) found that liquidity has a negative and significant 
influence on financial distress of manufacturing companies.  
According to CBK (2013), an institution shall maintain such minimum holding of liquid 
assets as the Central Bank may from time to time determine. Currently an institution is 
required to maintain a statutory minimum of twenty per cent of all its deposit liabilities, 





2.3.2.1.6.6 Market Risk 
Market risk represents risk of loss in balance and off-balance sheet items due to changes 
in market prices (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). According to 
Mirkovic, Dasic & Siljkovic (2013), emergence of market risk can be caused by the 
following key factors: equity prices, interest rates, foreign exchange rate and commodity 
risk This study limited itself to interest rate risk due to unavailability of data regarding 
the other market risks. It used gap analysis as the measure of interest rate risk due to 
ease of use. 
Gap analysis, commences with the choice of a suitable time horizon. The quantum of the 
balance sheet items that will re-price within the period is then determined. The amounts 
involved give the rate-sensitive liabilities and the rate-sensitive assets. The gap is the 
difference between the two. The interest-rate exposure is the change in net interest 
income that occurs in response to a change in interest rates (Dowd, 2002). In their study 
on market risk management in banks post the global financial crisis of 2007, Mirkovic 
et. al., (2013) concluded that the importance of market risk cannot be ignored and its 
management together with the other risks contributes to increased efficacy and thus 
stability in the banking sector. 
H6: Financial Soundness significantly influences financial distress of Kenyan 
commercial banks 
2.3.2.2 Macro-economic factors that influence financial distress  
According to Ongore (2013) external factors are those which are outside the control of 
an entity.  In the study by OCC (1988), depressed or poor environments were the 
product of the deterioration in the commercial real estate, oil and gas or agricultural 
sectors. A bank’s failure having operated in depressed or poor local economies does not 





The OCC (1988) study further showed that an adverse economy was a significant factor 
in 35 percent of the failures. Even so, a depressed economic environment was the sole 
significant cause of failure in only 7 percent of the banks surveyed. The remaining failed 
banks that operated in depressed economies had significant internal problems as well. 
The evidence from healthy and rehabilitated banks also supported the OCC’s hypothesis 
that economic conditions are rarely the primary factor in determining a bank's condition. 
However, Wulandari, Musdholifah and Kusairi (2017), differ with the OCC’s findings. 
In their study aimed at examining the impact of macro-economic and internal factors on 
banking distress, results showed that economic growth was negatively significant for 
predicting banking distress. However, inflation as well as interest rate and exchange rate 
did not significantly affect banking distress. 
Yirgu (2017) partially agrees with Wulandari, Musdholifah and Kusairi (2017). In the 
study on determinants of financial distress using empirical evidence from banks in 
Ethiopia, the results showed that economic growth and saving interest rate had 
significantly negative and positive effects on banking financial distress respectively but 
inflation was not significant. For purposes of this study, the Central Bank Rate was used 
as the measure of interest rates as it is the benchmark for all lending and deposit rates. 
Findings by Kiganda & Evans (2014), Rao & Lakew (2012), Ramadan et al., (2011) and 
Ongore (2013) on the effect of macro-economic factors on bank profitability all showed 
that macroeconomic factors had an insignificant influence on bank profitability. They 
thus agreed with the OCC (1988) but differed with Yirgu (2017) and Wulandari, 
Musdholifah and Kusairi (2017). These studies did not however focus on financial 
distress.  
In a study focusing on the period of the Great Depression and analysing interbank 
connections, contagion and bank distress within the period, new data on interbank 





stable (Calomiris, Jaremski and Wheelock, 2019). Further, after the establishment of the 
Federal Reserve, banks took on the expectation that the Fed would reduce network risk, 
suggested by their management of cash and capital buffers, which became more 
unresponsive to network risk. This could be viewed in such manner because the Fed’s 
presence was viewed to provide a cushion against liquidity risk leading to banks 
maintaining less cash and capital buffers. In this way, the Fed likely contributed to the 
banking system’s vulnerability to contagion during the Depression (Calomiris, Jaremski 
and Wheelock, 2019). 






2.4 Conceptual Framework  
According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) and Smith (2004) a conceptual framework 
is that which recognises the model being researched and the connection between the 
independent and dependent factors. The conceptual frame work and variable 
operationalization is presented below in Figure 1 and Table 1 below: 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
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Table 1: Variable Operationalization 
  Variables Measurement Citations/Source 
1 Financial Distress Altman Z-Score  Mamo (2011) 
2 Leverage Total Debt/Total 
Liabilities 
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 
(2006)  
3 Overly Aggressive Activity Loans/Deposits OCC (1988) 
    Total Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets 
Basu (2003) 




5 Capital Adequacy Total Capital/ Total 
Risk Weighted Assets 
CBK (2013) 
    Core Capital/ Total 
Risk Weighted Assets 
CBK (2013) 
6 Credit Risk & Asset Quality (Gross NPL’s) /Gross 
Loans  
Ugoani (2015)  




Sufian and Kamarudin (2012). 
8 Earnings ROA Reddy (2012) 
9 Liquidity Net Liquid Assets/ 
Total deposits & 
Short Term Liabilities  
CBK (2013) 
10 Market Risk Relative Gap/Total 
Assets 
Dowd (2002) 
11 Bank Size Logarithm of Assets Muigai & Muriithi, (2017) 
12 Ownership Public or Private Al-Khouri (2012) 
13 Economic Growth GDP Growth OCC (1988) 
14 Central Bank Rate CBR Yirgu (2017)  
15 Interbank Activity Annual Interbank 
Volumes/Aggregate 
Interbank Volumes 






CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter covers the research methodology which includes the research philosophy, 
research design, population, data collection methods, data analysis and research quality. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
The study has opted for postpositivistic worldview because its assumptions represent the 
traditional form of research which hold true especially for quantitative research 
(Creswell, 2014). Postpositivists hold a deterministic and reductionistic philosophy. The 
deterministic philosophy is one whereby, causes determine outcomes. It is reductionistic 
because the intention is to minimise the nortions to a discrete set (Creswell, 2014). 
Under the postpositivistic philosophical approach, this study set up the hypotheses on 
the basis of the existing relevant theories. Then these hypotheses were tested and 
confirmed or disproved by use of quantitative and statistical methods. 
3.3 The Research Design 
In order to obtain answers to study objectives, the research design is the structure and 
plan of investigation considered (Cooper & Schindler, 2007). This study employed a 
quantitative research design. Under the quantitative design, this study tested the 
objective theories by examining the relationship among variables. These variables were 
measured, and numbered data analysed using statistical procedures. 
3.4 Population  
Population is an entire group of elements or persons, that have no less than one aspect in 
common (Kombo & Tromp, 2009). The population of this study is all the commercial 





under statutory management and banks in transition awaiting to be acquired, in the 
respective years when these actions took place. This exclusion is due to unavailability of 
data from that point going forward. For purposes of this study, the whole population of 
Kenyan commercial banks with the said exclusions, were subject to the study. Hence it 
employed the census approach. 
3.5 Data Collection Methods 
As per Gall, Gall & Borg (2007), data collection refers to the process of gathering 
unprocessed and raw data, which following the scientific process of data analysis, can be 
processed into meaningful information. For purposes of this study secondary data was 
collected.   
3.5.1 Secondary Data 
Secondary data is data that already exists and can be obtained from sources like 
organizational records, government sources, corporate fillings, print, and trade, business 
associations among other sources (Saunders et al., (2012). 
In this study, the secondary data plays a key role. The secondary data is collected for the 
research period starting from the years 2012 to 2018. Secondary data was collected on: 
capital adequacy, asset quality, management performance & operational efficiency, 
earnings & profitability, liquidity, market risk, total assets, total liabilities, debt, 
ownership, bank size, total fixed assets, net loans, total deposits, total insider loans, core 
capital, working capital, earnings before interest and taxes, retained earnings, book value 
of equity, GDP, Central Bank Rate and Interbank Volumes.   
The secondary data has been extracted from the financial statements of commercial 
banks and the Central Bank of Kenya website for the period of study. The period of 
study is from the year 2012 to 2018. This period covers a full economic cycle which 





have failed in the recent past. The years 2017 and 2018 are also of interest as they are 
the years when the full annual impact of the interest rate capping law was experienced 
by banks. The study is capped at the 2018 due to availability of data. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is seen as a practice which involves raw data being arranged and organized 
so as to allow for the extraction of useful information from it (Gall et al., 2007). Data 
Analysis was used as per table 2 below.  
Table 2: Data Analysis  
  Variables Measurement 
Test  
1 Financial Distress Altman Z-Score  Zones of Discrimination 
2 Leverage Total Debt/Total 
Liabilities 
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Industry 
Average) 
3 Overly Aggressive Activity Loans/Deposits Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Industry 
Average) 
    Total Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets 
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Industry 
Average) 
4 Insider Lending Total Insider Loans & 
Advances/Core 
Capital 
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Regulatory 
Cut-Off) 
5 Capital Adequacy Total Capital/ Total 
Risk Weighted Assets 
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Regulatory 
Cut-Off) 
    Core Capital/ Total 
Risk Weighted Assets 
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Regulatory 
Cut-Off) 
6 Credit Risk & Asset Quality (Gross NPL’s) /Gross 
Loans  
Correlation & Regression analysis. 










Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Industry 
Average) 
8 Earnings ROA Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Industry 
Average) 
9 Liquidity Net Liquid Assets/ 
Total deposits & 
Short Term Liabilities  
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Regulatory 
Cut-Off) 
10 Market Risk Relative Gap/Total 
Assets 
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Industry 
Average) 
11 Bank Size Logarithm of Assets Correlation & Regression analysis. 
Variance Analysis (Actual Vs Industry 
Average) 
12 Ownership Public or Private Correlation & Regression analysis. 
13 Economic Growth GDP Growth Correlation & Regression analysis. 
14 Central Bank Rate CBR Correlation & Regression analysis. 
15 Interbank Activity Annual Interbank 
Volumes/Aggregate 
Interbank Volumes 
Correlation & Regression analysis. 
3.6.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
MDA is a technique that allows for the distinction between two or more collection or 
group of items with regard to several factors. For this particular case, it is to distinguish 
between failing and non-failing firms with regard to financial distress. Altman’s Z-score 
pooled various measures of risk or profitability. Using key features which best 
differentiate between the groups, MDA then tries to develop a quadratic or linear 
combination of these features. This model employs five financial ratios which are 
weighted so as to maximize the predictive power of the model. A Z score or zeta model 
which is an overall discriminate score is then produced by the model. The result is a 






The original Z score whose applicability was restricted to public manufacturing firms 
was as below (Altman et al., 2014): 
Z = 1.2T1 + 1.4T2 + 3.3T3 + 0.6T4 + 0.999T5 
Where: 
T1 = Working Capital / Total Assets 
T2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
T3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
T4 = Market Value of Equity / Total Liabilities 
T5 = Sales/ Total Assets 
Later, the market value of equity was changed to the book value of equity and the model 
applicability was expanded to include private and non-manufacturing firms (Altman et 
al., 2014). 
The amended coefficients were: 
Z=0.717T1 + 0.847T2 + 3.107T3 +0.420T4 + 0.998T5 
To include emerging markets, the model was amended in 1995 and applicability 
expanded to include manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies as well as public 
and private firms (Altman et al., 2014): 
The revised coefficients were: 
Z=6.56T1+3.26T2+6.72T3+1.05T4 
For purposes of this study, the model used to investigate objective one was as below. 
The model was arrived at due to its applicability to non-manufacturing companies as 






The ratios are as follows. 
T1 = Working Capital / Total Assets 
T2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
T3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
T4 = Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities 
The zones of discrimination as guided by the model are as follows: 
Safe Zone > 2.60 
Grey Zone > 1.10 to 2.60 
Financial Distressed Zone < 1.10 
3.6.2 Linear Regression Model 
Linear regression model was used and diagnostic tests carried out. The panel data 
regression model that was used is: 
Zit = βit + βxit' + µit, i = 1... N (Banks) t = 1,...,T (time) 
Where: 
β1= Leverage 
β2= Overly Aggressive Activity 
β3= Insider Lending 
β4 = Capital Adequacy 





β6= Management Efficiency & Operational Risks 
β7= Earnings 
β8= Liquidity 
β9= Market Risk 
β10= Ownership 
β11= Bank Size 
β12= Economic Growth 
β13 = Central Bank Rate 
β14 = Interbank Activity 
Linear regression model was also used on the spreads and diagnostic tests carried out. 
The panel data regression model that was used is: 
Zit = cit + Cxit' + µit, i = 1... N (Banks) t = 1,...,T (time) 
Where: 
C1= Leverage Spread Against Industry Average 
C2= Overly Aggressive Activity Spread Against Industry Average 
C3= Insider Lending Spread Against Industry Average 
C4 = Capital Adequacy Spread Against Regulatory Cut-Off 
C5= Credit Risk & Asset Quality Spread Against Regulatory Cut-Off 





C7= Earnings Against Industry Average 
C8= Liquidity Spread Against Regulatory Cut-Off 
C9= Market Risk Spread Against Industry Average 
C10= Bank Size Spread Against Industry Average 
3.6.3 Panel Data Analysis 
The objective of this panel analysis is to investigate in relation to Objective 2 and 3 of 
the study: 
1) The effect of bank specific factors on the level of financial distress in Kenyan 
commercial banks. 
2) The effect of macro-economic factors on the level of financial distress in 
Kenyan commercial banks. 
This section will detail the model specifications. The description of the panel approach 
and the diagnostic tests are provided in appendix 1.  
3.6.3.1 Model 1: Fundamental Factor Model 
This Model specification uses the bank specific factors to explain financial distress in an 
attempt to answer Objective two. This model specification uses the following company 








 is the measure of Leverage (Total Debt/Total Liabilities) 
 is the measure of Market Risk (Relative Gap/Total Assets) 
 is the first measure of Overly aggressive activity (Net Loans/Deposits) 
 is the second measure of Overly aggressive activity (Total Fixed Assets/Total 
Assets) 
 is the measure of Insider Lending (Total Insider Loans & Advances/Core Capital) 
 is the first Capital Adequacy Ratio (Total Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets) 
 is the second Capital Adequacy Ratio (Core Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets) 
 is the measure of Credit Risk & Asset Quality (Gross NPL’s as a ratio of Gross 
Loans) 
 is the measure of Management Efficiency & Operational Risk (Operating 
Expenses/Revenues) 
 is the measure of Earnings (Return on Assets) 
 is a measure of Liquidity (Net Liquid Assets/ Total deposits and Short-Term 
Liabilities) 
 is a dummy variable for Ownership Structure which takes a value of 1 if the 
company is privately owned, and 0 if publicly-owned 





3.6.3.2 Model 2: Fundamental Factor Model with Spreads 
This Model specification follows from Model 1 above and uses the spreads of the 
company attributes to explain financial distress in an attempt to further answer objective 
two. The spreads have been calculated by taking the difference between the actual ratio 
less the regulatory cut-off (where applicable) or the market average where no regulatory 
cut-off exists. The regulatory cut off points exist for both measures of capital adequacy 
(CA1 and CA2), Liquidity and Insider Lending. 
 
3.6.3.3 Model 3: Macroeconomic Factor Model 




 is the measure of Economic Growth (GDP Growth) 
 is the Central Bank Rate 






3.7 Research Quality 
3.7.1 Instrument Reliability  
Reliability within quantitative research refers to the stability, consistency, and 
repeatability of results. If consistent outcomes have been obtained in identical situations 
but different circumstances, the result of a researcher is considered reliable (Twycross & 
Shields, 2004). This study tested for internal consistencies to check if approximately the 
same results are achieved when the same test is carried out. 
3.7.2 Instrument Validity 
Absolute validity is difficult to establish in research (Bryman & Cramer, 1997). 
Secondary data was used as obtained without any manipulation of the figures.  
The usual procedure in evaluating the content validity of a measure is to employ the 
advice of a professional or expert in a particular field (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999). 
Expert opinion was requested from the study supervisor. The supervisor gave 
suggestions of corrections to be made to the study and in that manner assisted in 
improving the content validity of the data that was collected.  
3.7.3 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations refer to a system of values which can significantly change 
previously held stands about actions and choices (Fouka & Mantzorou, 2011). This 
study bore respect for anonymity and confidentiality by not disclosing the names of 





CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the research findings obtained from the study. The summary of 
number of banks in the research study is shown in Table 3 below:  
Table 3: Summary of the number of Banks involved in the Study 
Year 











2012 43 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 43 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 43 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 41 -2 0 0 0 0 
2016 39 -1 0 0 0 -1 
2017 40 0 -2 1 2 0 
2018 39 0 0 0 0 -1 
The chapter further provides descriptive statistics for each research objectives. The 
diagnostic tests justifying the choice of model for both objectives two and three are 
further detailed in Appendix 2, 3 and 4 respectively.  
4.2. Level of Financial Distress in Kenyan Commercial Banks 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Level of Financial Distress in Kenyan Banks 
A summary of the descriptive statistics on the level of financial distress for the Banks is 
shown in Table 4 below: 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Level of Financial Distress 
Financial 
Distress 
n mean std dev median min max range skew kurtosis 





The average level of financial distress as measured by the Z-Score for the Banking 
sector across all years of study is 2.47. A simple analysis of normality on the basis of the 
skewness and kurtosis show some deviation from the typical normal distribution where a 
skewness of 0 and a kurtosis of 3 is expected. 
The summary statistics grouped by year are also summarized further in Table 5 below. A 
related visualization of the distribution of the levels of financial distress across the years 
is shown in Figure 1 below. 
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Level of Financial Distress by Year 
 
n mean sd median min max range skew kurtosis 
2012 43 2.73 0.87 2.6 1.15 5.35 4.2 0.92 0.93 
2013 43 2.63 0.88 2.51 1.12 4.98 3.86 0.69 0.14 
2014 43 2.57 0.9 2.44 1.07 5.14 4.07 0.85 0.35 
2015 41 2.26 0.94 2.24 0.56 4.69 4.13 0.49 0.03 
2016 39 2.34 1.14 2.44 -0.03 4.8 4.83 0.05 -0.41 
2017 40 2.22 1.35 2.48 -1.34 4.34 5.68 -0.92 0.5 
2018 39 2.54 1.44 2.39 -2.44 5.17 7.61 -0.95 1.85 
An interesting pattern arises here. The minimum level of financial distress worsens 
gradually from 2012 to 2018, with a minimum score of 1.15 noted in 2012, down to a 
score of -2.44 noted in 2018. The distribution of the responses provides more 









Figure 2: Distribution of Financial Distress Levels by Year 
 
It is noted that across the years, the spread of histogram has become slightly wider, 
especially in recent times (2015 to 2018), with the lower tail extending from year to 
year. This is backed up by the worsening minimum level of financial distress, as well as 
the increasing standard deviation from 2012 to 2018. This is an indication of the 
declining performance of the overall banking sector. Similarly, the skewness of the 
distribution gradually shifts from positive to negative when we hit 2017 (-0.92 in 2017, -





significantly affected by the year 2018, which registers a kurtosis of 1.85, with the other 
years having significantly lower levels of kurtosis. 
Figure 3 below further illustrates the number of banks within the various discrimination 
zones across the study period. 
Figure 3: Illustration of Financial Distress Zones by Year 
 
4.3. The Effect of Bank-Specific Factors on the Level of Financial Distress 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Bank Specific Variables 
A summary of the descriptive statistics on the Bank Specific Factors is shown in Table 6 
below: 




















































23.3 11.6 20.2 -22.0 94.5 116.5 2.1 12.2 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Core Capital/ Total 
Risk Weighted 
Assets 












103.5 374.0 67.0 19.9 6321.7 6301.7 16.1 267.2 
Earnings ROA 1.3 3.3 1.8% -24.5 15.7 40.1 -3.4 26.6 
Liquidity 
Net Liquid Assets/ 
Total deposits & 
Short-Term Libs 








7.6 0.6 7.5 6.4 8.8 2.4 0.2 2.0 
An assessment of the median values indicates that banks are moderately aggressive on 
the basis of how much they lend relative to the size of their deposits (median of 78%). 
The median scores for Capital adequacy (20.2% and 17.7%) are well above the 
regulatory cut-offs of 14.50% for Total Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets and 10.5% 
for Core Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets. The median score for management 
efficiency is quite high, indicating that banks spend more than half of their revenues on 
operating expenses. The median liquidity is also significantly above the regulatory 
requirement of 20%. The discussion here does not focus on the mean points due to the 
effect of the outlier data points which significantly skew the statistics. 
4.3.2 Results for Bank Specific Variables 
The results from a robust (corrected for autocorrelation) Fixed Effects model estimation 





Table 7: Fixed-effects (within) regression with Bank Specific Variables  
R-sq:            
within 90.4%   Number of observations 288  
between 86.5%   Number of Groups 45  
overall 86.1%          
F (12,44) 146.7    Prob>F 0.0000  




Std. Error t P>|t|  






Net Loans/Deposits 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.7460  
Overly Aggressive 
Activity 
Total Fixed Assets/Total 
Assets 





Total Insider Loans & 
Advances/Core Capital 
-0.03 0.02 -1.96 0.0570 * 
Capital Adequacy 
Total Capital/ Total Risk 
Weighted Assets 
0.68 0.88 0.77 0.4450  
Capital Adequacy 
Core Capital/ Total Risk 
Weighted Assets 
-0.54 1.06 -0.51 0.6110  
Credit Risk & Asset 
Quality 
Gross NPL’s /Gross Loans  -0.36 0.39 -0.92 0.3650  
Management Efficiency Operating Expenses/Revenues 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.3610  





Net Liquid Assets/ Total 
deposits & Short-Term Libs  




Market Risk Relative Gap/Total Assets -0.91 0.37 -2.48 0.0170 
*
* 
Size Log Assets -0.10 0.19 -0.51 0.6100  
Ownership Dummy Variable 0.00 (omitted) 
  
 
  _cons 1.34 1.40 0.96 0.3430  
Significance Key: (*** 0.01), (** 0.05), (* 0.10) 
The model explains approximately 86% of the variation in financial distress levels for 
the banks across the years. The results above show that Leverage (measured by Total 
Debt/Total Liabilities), Overly Aggressive Activity (measured by Total Fixed Assets as 
a ratio of Total Assets) and Market Risk (Relative Gap/Total Assets) negatively and 





these ratios, there is a decline in the Z-Score of the bank, indicating an increase in 
financial distress. Their significance is assessed at the 95% confidence interval. The 
effect of Overly Aggressive Activity is much larger than that of Leverage and Market 
Risk. 
On the other hand, Earnings (measured by ROA) and Liquidity (measured by Net Liquid 
Assets/ Total deposits & Short-Term Liabilities) are found to positively and significantly 
affect the Z-Score given to a bank at a 95% confidence interval. This means that when 
the earnings and liquidity measures of the bank increase, the z-score increases as well, 
indicating greater banking stability. The positive effect of Earnings is much larger than 
that of Liquidity. The variable ownership is omitted from the fixed effects model as it is 
a dummy variable, which is already taken care of in the fixed effects. 
4.3.3 The Effect of Spread Variables on the Level of Financial Distress 
The spreads have been calculated by taking the difference between the actual ratio less 
the minimum regulatory cut-off (where applicable), or the market average where the 
regulatory cut-off does not exist. The regulatory cut off points exist for both measures of 
capital adequacy (CA1 and CA2) and Liquidity.  
Specifically, when looking at the variable on Insider Lending (Total Insider Loans & 
Advances/Core Capital), the spread is calculated differently. This is done by deducting 
the actual ratio from the maximum regulatory cut-off; a positive spread indicates that 
the bank has not reached the regulatory limit, whereas a negative implies the bank has 
surpassed the regulatory limit of 100%. 
4.3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Spread Variables 






Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Spread Variables 
Indicator mean std dev median min max range skewness kurtosis 








0.0% 3.2% -0.7% -3.5% 28.1% 31.6% 5.0 38.5 
Insider Lending 71.8% 50.2% 80.8% -656.5% 106.5% 763.0% -11.1 156.2 
Capital Adequacy 8.8% 11.6% 5.7% -36.5% 80.0% 116.5% 2.1 12.2 
Capital Adequacy 10.9% 11.9% 7.2% -34.0% 84.0% 118.0% 2.1 11.9 
Credit Risk & 
Asset Quality 
0.0% 11.3% -3.0% -18.8% 59.9% 78.6% 2.1 9.2 
Management 
Efficiency 
0.0% 368.5% -14.6% -241.0% 6060.7% 6301.7% 15.5 256.0 
Earnings 0.0% 3.2% 0.4% -24.5% 13.3% 37.8% -3.3 24.7 
Liquidity 23.0% 18.2% 19.2% -29.5% 103.6% 133.1% 1.0 5.1 
Market Risk 20.3% 8.4% 20.6% -13.7% 53.6% 67.3% -0.1 4.4 
Size 0.0 0.6 -0.1 -1.2 1.2 2.4 0.2 2.0 
An assessment of the median values indicates that the median spread for management 
efficiency is negative, meaning majority of the banks are below the industry average for 
management efficiency. The median spread for leverage is also slightly negative, 
meaning majority of the banks are below the industry average for leverage. With an 
80.8% median spread, this indicates that the median level of insider lending in the 
banking sector is approximately 20.2% across the years used in the study. The 
discussion here does not focus on the mean points due to the effect of the outlier data 






4.3.3.2 Results for Spread Variables 
The results from a robust (corrected for autocorrelation) Fixed Effects model estimation 
(model specification 2) are shown in the table 9 below: 
Table 9: Fixed Effects (within) Regression with Spread Variables  
R-sq:            




between 71.4%   Number of Groups 45  
overall 75.6%          
F (12,44) 141     Prob>F 0.0000  
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.2756          





t P>|t|  
Leverage 
Spread -- Total Debt/Total 
Liabilities 
-1.65 0.42 -3.95 0.0000 *** 
Overly Aggressive 
Activity 
Spread -- Net Loans/Deposits 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.8920  
Overly Aggressive 
Activity 
Spread -- Total Fixed Assets/Total 
Assets 
-7.27 1.13 -6.43 0.0000 *** 
Insider Lending 
Spread -- Total Insider Loans & 
Advances/Core Capital 
0.06 0.02 3.75 0.0010 *** 
Capital Adequacy 
Spread -- Total Capital/ Total Risk 
Weighted Assets 
1.33 1.00 1.32 0.1930  
Capital Adequacy 
Spread -- Core Capital/ Total Risk 
Weighted Assets 
-1.78 1.19 -1.50 0.1410  
Credit Risk & Asset 
Quality 
Spread -- (Gross NPL’s) /Gross 
Loans  
-0.68 0.39 -1.72 0.0920 * 
Management 
Efficiency 
Spread -- Operating 
Expenses/Revenues 
0.01 0.01 1.13 0.2640  
Earnings Spread -- ROA 10.80 1.90 5.68 0.0000 *** 
Liquidity 
Spread -- Net Liquid Assets/ Total 
deposits & Short-Term Libs 
5.11 0.27 18.88 0.0000 *** 
Market Risk 
Spread -- Relative Gap/Total 
Assets 
-0.46 0.39 -1.18 0.2430  
Size Spread -- Log Assets -0.61 0.16 -3.76 0.0000 *** 
Ownership Dummy Variable 0.00 (omitted) 
  
 
  _cons 1.40 0.10 14.62 0.0000  





The model explains approximately 76% of the variation in financial distress levels for 
the banks across the years, a slight decline from Model 1. The results above show that 
the spread of Leverage, Overly Aggressive Activity (measured by Total Fixed Assets as 
a ratio of Total Assets) and Size (measured by log of total assets) negatively and 
significantly affect the level of financial distress. Their significance is assessed at the 
95% confidence interval. This means that with a unit increase in the spread (an increase 
in the margin between the bank’s ratio and the regulatory cut off of the industry 
average), there is a decline in the Z-Score of the bank, indicating an increase in financial 
distress. For example, when the bank has significantly higher leverage levels as 
compared to the industry leverage, its financial stability declines. Similarly, a large bank 
(whose size is larger than industry average) or an overly aggressive bank that holds a 
vast amount of fixed assets (greater than industry average) have lower levels of financial 
stability. The effect of overly aggressive activity is much larger than that of Size and 
Leverage. 
For insider lending, the spread is calculated differently by taking the regulatory cut off 
(100%) less the bank’s level of insider lending. This means that a higher spread is 
preferable since the banks insider lending is further below the regulatory ceiling. The 
coefficient on this is positive and significant at the 95% confidence interval. This means 
that a higher spread (lower insider lending) leads to higher levels of financial stability 
for the bank.  
On the other hand, the spread for Earnings (ROA less industry average) and the spread 
for Liquidity (measured by Liquidity ratio less the regulatory cut-off of 20%) are found 
to positively and significantly affect the Z-Score given to a bank at a 95% confidence 
interval. This means that when the bank’s earnings and liquidity measures are higher 
than the industry average or the regulatory cut-off mark, the z-score increases, indicating 
greater banking stability. The effect of earnings is significantly higher than that of 





The variable ownership is omitted from the fixed effects model as it is a dummy 
variable, which is already taken care of in the fixed effects. 
4.4 The Effect of Macro-economic Variables on the Level of Financial Distress 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Macro-economic Variables 
A summary of the descriptive statistics on the macroeconomic variables is shown in the 
table 10 below: 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Macroeconomic Variables 
Indicator mean std dev median min max range skewness kurtosis 
Economic 
Growth 
5.4% 0.5% 5.7% 4.6% 5.9% 1.3% -0.7 2.0 
Central Bank 
Rate 
10.4% 2.3% 10.0% 8.5% 15.8% 7.3% 1.7 4.4 
Interbank 
Activity 
14.3% 4.7% 16.3% 3.6% 19.1% 15.5% -1.5 4.0 
An assessment of the mean values indicates that economic growth and interbank activity 
record a negative skew across the years studied. Interbank activity is more negatively 
skewed as compared to Economic Growth. The lowest level of interbank activity was 
seen in 2012 (3.6%). The highest was recorded in 2015 (19.1%). 
4.4.2 Results for Macro-economic Variables 
The results from a robust (corrected for autocorrelation) Random Effects model 
estimation (model specification 3) are shown in table 11 below: 
Table 11: Random Effects Model Estimation with Macroeconomic Variables 
R-sq:            








         











t P>|t|  
Economic Growth GDP Growth -9.66 9.59 -1.01 0.3140  
Central Bank Rate CBR -10.45 3.43 -3.05 0.0020 *** 
Interbank Activity 
Annual Interbank Volumes/Aggregate 
Volumes 
-6.36 1.69 -3.77 0.0000 *** 
 
cons 4.96 0.91 5.46 0.0000  
Significance Key: (*** 0.01), (** 0.05), (* 0.10) 
The R-squared of this model is very poor compared to Model 1 and 2 above. This could 
be explained by the fact that the main significant variables have been factored out by the 
bank specific variables and the bank specific spreads which combined have explained 
over 86% of the variation in financial distress levels for the banks.  The results however 
indicate that the Central Bank Rate and the level of Interbank Activity both negatively 
and significantly affect the level of financial distress. Their significance is assessed at 
the 95% confidence interval.  
That notwithstanding, Economic Growth is found to be insignificant in affecting the 
level of financial distress. For the two significant variables, this means that with a unit 
increase in the Central Bank Rate and the ratio of Annual Interbank Volumes/Aggregate 
Volumes, there is a decline in the Z-Score of the bank, indicating an increase in financial 
distress. When the Central bank charges a higher rate of interest on loans to banks, the 
stability of banks is negatively affected. Similarly, increased interbank lending in the 





CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the summary of findings, conclusions drawn and 
recommendations made. This is presented according to the objectives of the study. The 
conclusions are aligned to the three objectives and seven hypotheses pursued by the 
study. 
5.2 Summary of the Findings 
5.2.1 Level of Financial Distress in Kenyan Commercial Banks. 
In the year 2012 and 2013 there were no commercial banks under financial distress. This 
however grew to 1 bank in the year 2014, 4 banks in the year 2015,6 banks in the year 
2016 and 2017 and lastly reducing to 5 banks in the year 2018. One bank did not publish 
their financial statement for the year 2016 and another had not published their 2018 
financial statement as at the time of carrying out this study. This is contrary to the CBK 
prudential guidelines (CBK, 2013). The non-publication in itself raises a red flag. The 
banks identified to be under financial distress in the years 2015 and 2016 did not include 
Imperial Bank and Chase Bank which were both put under receivership in the respective 
years. 
Banks in the grey zone were 22 in the year 2012, which grew to 26 in the year 2013, 29 
in the year 2014, 27 in the year 2015, 16 in the year 2016, 17 in the year 2017 and lastly 
15 in the year 2018. 
Bank in the safe zone were 21 in the year 2012, which reduced to 17 in the year 2013, 
further reduced to 13 in the year 2014, and reduced even further to 10 in the year 2015, 
only to pick up in the year 2016 and 2017 to 17 and lastly 19 in the year 2018. 
The increase of banks facing financial distress in the year 2015 and 2016 with minimal 





long-term ripple effect on the banking sector. Further analysis established that banks that 
displayed financial distress for over two years consistently funded a significant portion 
of their assets through LOLR lending. This is in line with the LOLR illiquidity theory 
which states market failure causes banks to suffer from an inability to roll over financing 
of assets (Drechsler, Drechsel, Schnabl & Ibanez, 2013). Onset of distress of other firms 
can be caused by the default of one firm. This is especially the case whereby firms hold 
significant liabilities of the defaulting firm. Banks further seek to limit their interbank 
exposures by dumping various classes of assets, which magnify price declines (Heider, 
Hoerova, and Holthausen 2015). The situation is made worse when the LOLR fails to 
provide sufficient liquidity to prevent contagion and thus not fulfill the expectations of 
banks that the LOLR would insure them against liquidity risk shocks (Calomiris, 
Jaremski and Wheelock (2019). 
When the bank failures occurred in the year 2015 and 2016, many of the banks holding 
significant liabilities in these banks sought to limit their interbank exposures by closing 
all correspondent relationships with banks they considered high risk. In a worse turn of 
events when Chase Bank faced a run on its deposits (Abdulla, 2018) many banks had the 
perception that CBK as the LOLR would provide sufficient liquidity to prevent 
contagion. When this did not happen, the interbank market shrunk by 30% (CBK, 2016) 
mainly affecting the banks considered risky. The interbank market is yet to recover to 
2015 volumes leaving the banks which cannot secure interbank funding to significantly 
rely on the LOLR for the funding of their assets allowing them avoid fire sales and to 
slowly de-leverage. Unfortunately, some of these banks continue to erode their asset 
value and hence earnings. This then leads to capital erosion. Alternative and timely 
solutions like acquisitions or liquidation need to be established. This is evident by the 






5.2.2 Effect of Bank Specific Factors on the Level of Financial Distress in Kenyan 
Commercial Banks 
Bank specific factors as measured by leverage, overly aggressive activity, insider 
lending, ownership structure, bank size and financial soundness (as indicated by capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, liquidity and market risk) 
explain approximately 86% of the variation in financial distress levels for the banks 
across the years. 
The results above show that Leverage (measured by Total Debt/Total Liabilities), 
Overly Aggressive Activity (measured by Total Fixed Assets as a ratio of Total Assets) 
and Market Risk (Relative Gap/Total Assets) negatively and significantly affect the level 
of financial distress. This means that with a unit increase in these ratios, there is a 
decline in the Z-Score of the bank, indicating an increase in financial distress.  
On the other hand, Earnings (measured by ROA) and Liquidity (measured by Net Liquid 
Assets/ Total deposits & Short-Term Liabilities) are found to positively and significantly 
affect financial distress. This means that when the earnings and liquidity measures of the 
bank increase, the z-score increases as well, indicating greater banking stability.  
The results of this study on the significant and negative influence of leverage on 
financial distress concur with those of Muigai (2016), Masdupi, Tasman & Davista 
(2018) and Muigai and Muriithi (2017). The study results however differ with Ebaid 
(2009) whose studies indicated that debt use had insignificant impact on financial 
distress. They further contrast those of Hadlock and James (2002) and Ghosh, Nag, and 
Sirmans (2000) whose study findings showed that there was a positive correlation 
between leverage and financial distress of the firm.  
The results of this study on the significant and negative influence of overly aggressive 
activity on financial distress agree with those of Basu (2003) and the OCC (1988). This 
is also in line with the market power theory. The level of risk that banks take largely 





banks consistently commanding well over 50% of the sector’s market share, the 
commercial banks fiercely compete with each other to extend or at worst retain their 
market share. This competition has seen Kenyan commercial banks open branches 
extensively, venture into mobile lending platforms and expand into other investments 
like subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures. Many of these investments may not be 
very efficient. 
The results on the significant and negative influence of market risk on financial distress 
agree with those of Mirkovic, Dasic & Siljkovic (2013). This is in line with the portfolio 
theory. Kenyan commercial banks have adopted higher risk in their portfolios subjecting 
them to interest rate risks. 
The study findings on the significant and positive influence of earnings on financial 
distress agree with those of Aspal & Sanjeev (2014) that high earnings quality ought to 
serve as a reliable indicator of future going concern status and operating performance of 
an organisation. It should also mirror the organization’s current operating performance. 
However, the findings differ with those of Ugoani (2015) and Masdupi, Tasman & 
Davista (2018) who found that profitability has a negative and significant influence on 
financial distress. 
The findings of this study on the significant and positive influence of liquidity on 
financial distress agree with those of Outecheva (2007), Kariuki (2013), Gruszczynski 
(2004) and Cheluget (2014). The findings however differ with Masdupi, Tasman & 
Davista (2018) who found that liquidity has a negative and significant influence on 
financial distress of manufacturing companies. These differences may have been 
observed because it appears that the onslaught of the financial distress was the recent 
bank failures which in itself created a liquidity event causing further financial distress of 
some banks. 
For the study period, over 60% of the banks under financial distress in any one year are 





(2012) and Hu and Zheng (2015) that government ownership helped firms decrease their 
degree of corporate financial distress. The study however differs with Md-Rus, Mohd, 
Latif and Alassan (2013) whose findings indicated that government ownership was not a 
significant factor in influencing financial distress. 
5.2.2.1 Effect of Spread Variables on the Level of Financial Distress in Kenyan 
Commercial Banks 
Spreads on bank specific variables explains approximately 76% of the variation in 
financial distress levels for the banks across the years. 
The spreads have been calculated by taking the difference between the actual ratio less 
the minimum regulatory cut-off (where applicable), or the market average where the 
regulatory cut-off does not exist. The regulatory cut off points exist for both capital 
adequacy and Liquidity. The variable on insider lending spread is calculated by 
deducting the actual ratio from the maximum regulatory cut-off; a positive spread 
indicates that the bank has not reached the regulatory limit, whereas a negative implies 
the bank has surpassed the regulatory limit of 100%. 
The results above show that the spread of Leverage, Overly Aggressive Activity 
(measured by Total Fixed Assets as a ratio of Total Assets) and Size (measured by log of 
total assets) negatively and significantly affect the level of financial distress. This means 
that with a unit increase in the spread (an increase in the margin between the bank’s ratio 
and the regulatory cut off or the industry average), there is a decline in the Z-Score of 
the bank, indicating an increase in financial distress. For example, when the bank has 
significantly higher leverage levels as compared to the industry leverage, its financial 
stability declines. Similarly, a large bank (whose size is larger than industry average) or 
an overly aggressive bank that holds a vast amount of fixed assets (greater than industry 





For insider lending, the spread is calculated differently by taking the regulatory cut off 
(100%) less the bank’s level of insider lending. This means that a higher spread is 
preferable since the banks insider lending is further below the regulatory ceiling. The 
coefficient on this is positive and significant at the 95% confidence interval. This means 
that a higher spread (lower insider lending) leads to higher levels of financial stability 
for the bank.  
On the other hand, the spread for Earnings (ROA less industry average) and the spread 
for Liquidity (measured by Liquidity ratio less the regulatory cut-off of 20%) are found 
to positively and significantly affect the Z-Score given to a bank at a 95% confidence 
interval. Meaning that when the bank’s earnings and liquidity measures are higher than 
the industry average or the regulatory cut-off mark, the z-score increases, indicating 
greater banking stability.  
These finding provide new knowledge in that, in addition to ratio analysis to establish 
financial distress, further analysis on the spreads of these ratios can not only validate but 
also provide significant additional information. In this study, the spreads of earnings and 
liquidity validate the earlier results that the two variables positively and significantly 
affect the level of financial distress. In a similar manner, the spreads of leverage and 
overly aggressive activity also validate the earlier results that that the two variables 
negatively and significantly affect the level of financial distress. In addition, the spreads 
on insider lending and size provide new information.  
This new information is in line with observations by Hunjak & Jakovčević (2001) that 
financial ratio evaluation need be complemented with other varying evaluations like 
competitive position, regulatory compliance, capital structure amongst other because a 
model that would adequately meet the needs of bank analysis and assessments is yet to 
be developed.  
The findings that insider lending significantly and positively influences the level of 





significantly and negatively influences the level of financial distress concurs with Marsh 
(1982), Gonenc (2005), Dittmar (2004), Khan (2012) and Maina and Ishmail (2014) but 
however differ with those of (Papadogonas (2006). 
5.2.3 Effect of Macro-economic Variables on the Level of Financial Distress in 
Kenyan Commercial Banks 
The R-squared of the macro-economic model is very poor.  Macro-economic variables 
explain approximately 1.94% of the variation in financial distress levels for the banks 
across the years. The explanation for this could be that the main significant variables 
have been factored out by the bank specific variables and the bank spreads which 
combined have explained over 86% of the variation in financial distress levels for the 
banks. Thus even the most ideal macro-economic model could only have explained no 
more than 14% of the variation in financial distress levels for the banks.  
The study findings that macro-economic factors had an insignificant effect on the levels 
of financial distress concur with those by the OCC (1988) that found that poor macro-
economic factors were the sole significant cause of failure in only 7% of the banks 
surveyed. Therefore, this study concurs with the OCC (1988) in their conclusion that 
economic conditions are mostly a secondary and not primary factor in determining a 
bank's condition.  
The study findings further concur with Kiganda & Evans (2014) whose results showed 
that macroeconomic factors have insignificant effect on bank profitability and hence 
earnings in Kenya. The study is also consistent with the findings of Rao & Lakew 
(2012) whose results indicated that external factors had a statistically insignificant effect 
on the profitability and thus earnings of commercial banks operating in Ethiopia. It is 
also consistent with the study of Ramadan et al., (2011) whose results associated with 
the macro-economic determinants showed a positive insignificant impact on return on 





affect bank profitability and hence earnings. The discussions here focus on earnings as 
the study findings have already established that earnings positively and significantly 
influence the level of financial distress in Kenyan commercial banks. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The increase of banks facing financial distress in the year 2015 and 2016 with minimal 
changes thereafter signifies that the bank failures of 2015 and 2016 had a significant and 
long-term ripple effect on the banking sector. Further analysis established that banks that 
displayed financial distress for over two years consistently funded a significant portion 
of their assets through LOLR lending. In addition, the outlier data points which have 
significantly skewed the results have been caused by the worsening position of one 
bank. This signifies that continuous reliance on LOLR lending does not necessarily 
improve the position of a bank. Constant monitoring and analysis needs to be carried out 
to establish at what point alternative solutions like acquisitions or liquidations need to be 
sort to avoid further loss of the value of bank assets and further capital erosion. 
The efforts of the Central Bank of Kenya to sell off some of the distressed banks has 
yielded positive effects with the level of financial distress of these banks improving to 
the grey zone. But the bigger question is how to avert the snow balling of financial 
distress as that experienced by banks after the three bank failures. 
When a bank experiences a panic-induced run on its deposits for whatever reason as was 
experienced in 2016, the Central Bank of Kenya needs to carry out a comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis before making a decision as to whether or not to provide liquidity 
to the distressed bank in order to avert contagion. The scope of this analysis should go 
beyond the distressed bank and also include possible scenario testing of the impact on 
the banking sector and the economy as a whole. 
Policies on LOLR should be well laid out and communicated to banks detailing the 





panic-induced run on deposits or failure to secure lending from the interbank market. 
Commercial banks on the other hand should continuously measure and monitor their 
levels of financial distress. The measures and frequency of monitoring should be 
incorporated in the banks’ Asset Liability Management policies. Financial distress levels 
in the bank and sector should be a standing agenda in the banks’ Asset Liability 
Committee and the Board risk committees. This will ensure that banks take a more 
proactive than reactive approach and that issues are identified and addressed in a timely 
manner. Banking supervision department should include the audit of this process in their 
supervisory plan. Further, CBK together with the banks’ internal and external auditors 
need to provide comfort as to the veracity and reliability of published bank financial 
statements. This will allow for effective measuring and analysis of financial distress of 
any commercial bank or the wider sector. The qualification of financial statements of 
one of the commercial banks raised doubts as to the true level of financial distress of that 
bank. This veracity and reliability should extend beyond the annual statements and 
should also include the quarterly financial statements. This will allow for reliable intra-
year analysis and avoid year end surprises. 
The results of this study on the significant and negative influence of leverage on 
financial distress signifies that proper analysis needs to be carried out by a bank before 
on-boarding debt to ensure that it does not plunge the bank into unnecessary financial 
distress. Scholars and academicians can assist in coming up with leverage models that 
can be customised for every bank and provide guidance on the optimal capital structure 
of the bank. This can be used to predict the optimal size of debt that the bank can on-
board. The results of this study on the significant and negative influence of overly 
aggressive activity (as measure by the proportion of total fixed assets to total assets) on 
financial distress signifies that the Central Bank of Kenya needs to demand more rigour 
from the banks before approving a new outfit in the form of a new branch, lending 





business plans, financial projections and scenario testing to ensure that banks do not 
open inefficient outfits that later erode capital. 
Financial ratio analysis complemented with different evaluations like competitive 
position, regulatory compliance, capital structure amongst others improves on the 
efficacy of the model. This is because a model that would fully satisfy the needs of bank 
analysis and evaluation is yet to be developed.  The use of a combination of models to 
explain the level of financial distress has provided new knowledge in that, additional 
analysis on the spreads of bank specific variables has not only validated their results but 
also provided significant additional information with regard to new variables that have 
significantly influenced the level of financial distress. 
The results of the study demonstrating that economic conditions are not the primary 
factor in determining a bank's condition is further evidenced by the fact that the 
distribution of banks across the three zones barely changed in the year 2017 despite the 
interest rate capping law having a full annual impact. The situation even further 
improves in 2018 when more banks move to the safe zone whilst the distressed zone 
remains barely unchanged. These results confirm past studies that bank specific 
weaknesses play a significant role in the decline of a majority of the failed and 
financially distressed banks compared to the macro-economic environment. 
5.4 Recommendations 
From the research findings, the study recommends to policy makers especially the 
Central Bank of Kenya, to lay out and communicate policies on LOLR lending, 
including clear terms and conditions under which banks can access LOLR lending either 
in the case of a panic-induced run on deposits or failure to secure lending from the 
interbank market. Time frames within which a bank can continuously rely on LOLR 
lending to finance its assets should be clearly stipulated as extended reliance by banks 
on the LOLR lending can lead to further deterioration of bank assets and capital erosion 





CBK together with the banks’ internal and external auditors need to provide comfort as 
to the veracity and reliability of published bank financial statements. This will allow for 
effective measuring and analysis of financial distress of any commercial bank or the 
wider sector. This veracity and reliability should extend beyond the annual statements 
and should also include the quarterly financial statements. The will allow for reliable 
intra-year analysis and avoid year end surprises. 
Central Bank of Kenya needs to demand more rigour from the banks before approving a 
new outfit in the form of a new branch, lending platform or other significant investment. 
This rigour should include provision of proper business plans, financial projections and 
scenario testing to ensure that banks to do open inefficient outfits that later erode capital. 
Commercial banks on the other hand should continuously measure and monitor their 
levels of financial distress. The measures and frequency of monitoring should be 
incorporated in the banks’ Asset Liability Management policies. Financial distress levels 
in the bank and sector should be a standing agenda in the banks’ Asset Liability 
Committee and the Board risk committee meetings. This will ensure that banks take a 
more proactive than reactive approach to issues regarding financial distress and that 
challenges are identified and addressed in a timely manner. Bank supervision should 
keep banks accountable by including audit of systems and processes used by banks to 
identify and monitor levels of financial distress, as part of their supervision plan. In 
addition, proper analysis needs to be carried out by bank management before on-
boarding debt to ensure that it does not plunge the bank into unnecessary financial 
distress. 
Scholars and academicians can assist in coming up with leverage models that can be 
customised for every bank and provide guidance on the optimal capital structure of the 
bank. This can be used to predict the optimal size of debt that the bank can on-board. 
Financial ratio analysis should be complemented with different evaluations like 





on the efficacy of the model. This is because a model that would fully satisfy the needs 
of bank analysis and evaluation is yet to be developed. Lastly, a similar study can be 
carried out in other sectors of the Finance industry including Micro-Finance Institutions 
and Saccos.  
5.5 Limitations 
This study employed secondary data from the financial statements of Kenyan 
commercial banks. This numbers may be subject to manipulation by management and 
conservatism. For banks that changed names within the study period either through an 
acquisition or other, the original name of the bank was retained throughout the study for 
consistency and reliability. 
The measure on market risk was limited to interest rate risk and excluded foreign exchange 
risk, equity prices, and residual risk due to unavailability of data. Gap analysis as used to 
measure market risk has its limitations in that it only applies to interest-rate risk on on-
balance sheet items, and rather than look at the impact on asset or liability values, it 
looks at the effect of interest rates on income. Its results are horizon period sensitive, so 
results are affected by the horizon period chosen. Some of the limitations of the Z-Score 
were evident in the study as it is not applicable to new companies with little or no 
earnings as they will score low regardless of their financial health. This was the case for 








Abdulla, Z. (2018). Investigation of Strategic Issues Causing Receivership in 
Commercial Banks in Kenya: A Case Study of Chase Bank (K) Ltd. Unpublised 
Research Project, USIU Africa. 
Adeniyi, A. M., Kenneth, U. O. (2014). Prediction of Bank Failure Using Camel and 
Market Information: Comparative Appraisal of Some Selected Banks in Nigeria. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5, (3). 
Al-Khouri, R. (2012). Government Ownership, Competition, and the Risk-Taking 
Attitude of  the GCC Banking System. In Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil 
K. Makhija (ed.)  Advances in Financial Economics. Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited. 
Alshatti, A. A. S. (2014). The effect of the liquidity management on profitability in the 
Jordanian commercial banks. International Journal of Business and 
Management, 10. 
Al-Tamimi, H.A.H (2013).  Banks’ risk management: a comparison study of UAE 
national and foreign banks. The Journal of Risk Finance, 8(4), 394-409. 
Altman, E. (1968). Financial ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the prediction of corporate 
Bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23, 589-610. 
Altman, E. I., Iwanicz-Drozdowska, M., Laitinen, E.K. & Suvas, A. (2014). Distressed 
Firm and Bankruptcy Prediction in an International Context: A Review and 
Empirical Analysis of Altman's Z-Score Model, available at SSRN 2536340.  
Altman, E., Iwanicz-Drozdowska, M., Laitinen, K., Erkki A. and Suvas, A. (2017). 
Financial Distress Prediction in an International Context: A Review and 
Empirical Analysis of Altman's Z-Score Model. Journal of International 





Andualem, U. B., Selassie, E.G. and Tarekegn, G. (2016). Analysis of Financial Distress 
and its Determinants in Selected SMEs in Wolaita Zone. Global Journal of 
Management and Business Research: C Finance, 16 (8). 
Arellano, M. (1993). On the testing of correlated effects with panel data. Journal of 
Econometrics 59, 87-97. 
Argyrou, A. (2006). Predicting financial distress using neural networks. Another 
episode to the serial? (Unpublished Master’s Thesis). The Swedish School of 
Economics and Business Administration, Helsinki. 
Arun, T.G. and Turner, J.D. (2002). Financial Sector Reforms in Developing Countries: 
The Indian Experience. The World Economy, 25, 429-445. 
Aspal PK, Sanjeev D (2014). Financial performance assessment of banking sector in 
India: A case study of old private sector banks. The Business and Management 
Review, 5, 1-196. 
Atemnkeng, T. & Nzongang J. (2006). Market structure and profitability performance in the 
banking industry of CFA countries: The case of commercial banks in Cameroon. 
Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 8(2), 1-14. 
Athanasoglou, P. P., Brissimis, S. N. & Delis, M. D. (2008). Bank-specific, industry specific 
and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability. Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 18(2), 121-136. 
Aziz, M. A. & Dar, H. A. (2006), Predicting corporate bankruptcy: Where we stand? 
Corporate Governance, 6(1), 18-33. 
Bagehot, W. (1873). A Description of the Money Market, London. Lombard Street, 
Henry S. King and Co. 
Balestra, P., & Nerlove, M. (1966). Pooling cross-section and time-series data in the 






Baltagi, B. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. England: John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd. 
Baltagi, B., & Wu, P. (1999). Unequally Spaced Panel Data Regression with AR1 
Disturbances. Econometric Theory, 15, 814-823. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2011). Principles for the Sound 
Management of Operational Risk. Basel, Switzerland, Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Basu, N. (2003). Why do Banks Fail? International Review of Applied Economics,17, 3. 
Baye, M. R. (2010). Managerial Economics and Business Strategy (7th Ed.). New York, 
NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.  
Beaver, W. (1966). Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 4, 71-111. 
Berger, A. N. (1995). The Profit-Structure relationship in banking – Tests of Market 
Power and Efficient-Structure hypotheses. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 27 (2), 404-431. 
Berger, S. E. & Bonaccorsi de Patti (2006). Capital Structure and firm performance, A 
new  approach to testing agency theory and application to the bank industry. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 30, 1065-1102. 
Brealey R, Meyers S (2000). Principles of Corporate Finance, 6th Ed. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1980). The Lagrange multiplier test and its applications 
to model specification in econometrics. Review of Economic Studies, 47, 239–
253. 
Bryman, A.  & Cramer, D. (1997). Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS for Windows.  





Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2007). Business Research Methods. 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Calomiris, C. W., Jaremski, M. & Wheelock, D. C. (2019). Interbank Connections, 
Contagion and Bank Distress in the Great Depression. Working Paper 2019-
001A https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2019.001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Loius, 
Research Division. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1995). Annual Report. Nairobi. CBK. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2003 - 2017). Banking Supervision Division Annual Reports. 
Nairobi, CBK. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2013). Prudential Guidelines. Nairobi, CBK. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2015). Imperial Bank Ltd (In Receivership). Press Release, 
Nairobi, CBK. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2016). Chase Bank Ltd (In Receivership). Press Release, 
Nairobi, CBK. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2018). The Impact of Interest Rate Capping on the Kenyan 
Economy: Highlights. Draft for Comments, Nairobi, CBK. 
Central bank of kenya. (c2017). Https://www.centralbank.go.ke/annual-gdp/. Retrieved 
17 April, 2019, from https://www.centralbank.go.ke/annual-gdp/ 
Central bank of kenya. (c2017). Https://www.centralbank.go.ke/rates/interbank-rates-
volumes/. Retrieved 17 April, 2019, from 
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/rates/interbank-rates-volumes/ 
Central bank of kenya. (c2017). Https://www.centralbank.go.ke/rates/central-bank-rate/. 






Change, S. (2006). The Causes and Salvation Ways of Financial Distress Companies: 
An Empirical Research on the Listed Companies in China. Unpublished 
Research project, Bejing University. 
Cheluget, J. (2014). Determinants of Financial Distress In Insurance Companies In 
Kenya. PhD thesis, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology. 
Cheserek, B. K. (2005). The Determinants of Bank Failures: A survey of Commercial 
Banks in Kenya. Retrieved from http://repository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/ 
handle/11295/7842/Cheserek_The%20determinants%20of%20bank%20failures.
pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. 
Chimkono, E.E., Muturi, W. & Njeru, A. (2016).  Effect of Non-Performing Loans And 
Other Factors On Performance Of Commercial Banks in Malawi. International 
Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management, 4(2). 
Choi, I. (2001). Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of International Money and 
Finance 20, 249–272. 
Connelly, L. M. (2008). Pilot studies. Medsurg Nursing, 17(6), 411-2. 
Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2007). Business Research Methods. 9th Ed. New 
Delhi, India:  McGraw-Hill Publishing, Co. Ltd.  
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Method 
Approaches. Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications. 
Crowe, K. (2009). Liquidity risk management – more important than ever, Harland 
Financial Solutions. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 425. 
Dang, U. ( 2011). The CAMELS Rating System in Banking Supervision: A Case Study 
of Arcada University of Applied Sciences. International Business and Finance, 





Davydenko, S. (2005): When Do Firms Default? A Study of the Default Boundary. 
Working Paper, London Business School 
Dittmar, A. (2004). Capital structure in corporate spin‐ offs. The Journal of Business, 77 
(1), 9-43.  
Dowd, K. (2002). An Introduction to Market Risk. The Atrium, Southern Gate, 
Chichester, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Drechsler, I., Drechsel, T., Marques-Ibanez, D. & Schnabl, P. (2013). Who Borrows 
from the Lender of Last Resort? Discussion Paper. 
Ebaid, (2009). The impact of capital‐ structure choice on firm performance: empirical  
Fouka, G. & Mantzorou, M. (2011). What are the Major Ethical Issues in Conducting 
Research? Is there a Conflict between the Research Ethics and the Nature of 
Nursing? Health Science Journal, 5(1), 3-14. 
Gall, M. D., Gall, J. P., & Borg, W. R. (2007). Educational research: An introduction. 
Boston, MA: Pearson Education. 
Gathaiya, R. N. (2017). Analysis of Issues Affecting Collapsed Banksin Kenya From 
Year 2015 to2016. International Journal of Mangement and Business Studies, 
7(3) 
Ghosh, C., Nag, R. and Sirmans, C. (2000). The pricing of seasoned equity offerings: 
evidence from REITs. Real Estate Economics, 28, 363-84. 
Gilbert, L. R., Menon, K. and Schwartz, K. B. (1990). Predicting Bankruptcy for Firms 
in Financial Distress. Journal of Business Finance, 161-171. 
Gonenc, H. (2005). Comparison of debt financing between international and domestic 
firms: Evidence from Turkey, Germany and UK. International Journal of 





Gordon, M. J. (1971): Towards a Theory of Financial Distress. The Journal of Finance, 
26(2), 347-356 
Gruszczyński M. (2004). Financial Distress of Companies in Poland, International 
Advances in Economic Research, 10 (4), 249-256. 
Hadlock, C. J. and James, C. M. (2002). Do Banks Provide Financial Slack? Journal of 
Finance, 57(3), 1383-1419. 
Hansen, R. and Mowen, M. (2005). Management Accounting (7th Edition). Singapore: 
South-western. 
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46, 1251–
1271. 
Hayden, E., Porath, D., von Westernhagen, N., (2005). Does Diversification Improve the 
Performance of German Banks? Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios. 
Working Paper, Osterreichische Nationalbank and Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Heale, R. & Twycross, A. (2015). Validity and reliability in quantitative research. 
Evidence-Based Nursing, 18, 66-67. 
Heider, F., Hoerova, M. & Holthausen, C. (2015). Liquidity hoarding and interbank 
market rates: The role of counterparty risk. Journal of Financial Economics 
118(2), 336-354. 
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of Panel Data. In C. Hsiao. University of Southern 
California: Cambridge University Press. 
Hu, D., & Zheng, H. (2015). Does ownership structure affect the degree of corporate 
financial distress in China?. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, 5(1), 
35 – 50. 
Hunjak,T. (2001), «AHP based model for bank performance evaluation and rating », 





Imbierowicz, B. & Rauch, C. (2014). The Relationship between Liquidity Risk and 
Credit Risk in Banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 40 (C), 242-256. 
International Monetary Fund. (2017). Financial Soundness Indicators: Compilation 
Guide. Washington, D.C, IMF. 




Kargi, H.S. (2011). Credit Risk and the Performance of Nigerian Banks. Unpublished 
research project, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. 
Kariuki, H.N. (2013). The effect of financial distress on financial performance of 
commercial  banks in Kenya. MBA research project, University of Nairobi, 
Nairobi, KE: Acts Press. 
Kaufman, G. G. (2009). Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation. The Cato 
Journal, 16 (1). 
Kenya Deposit Insurance Corporation. (2015). Dubai Bank Kenya Ltd (In Receivership). 
Press Release, Nairobi. 
Khan, A. G. (2012). The relationship of capital structure decisions with firm 
performance: A study of the engineering sector of Pakistan. International 
Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2 (1), 245 - 262.  
Kiganda, E. & Evans, O. (2014). Effect of Macroeconomic Factors on Commercial 
Banks Profitability in Kenya: Case of Equity Bank Limited. Journal of 
Economics and Sustainable Development, 5(2), 46-56. 
Kombo, D.K., & Tromp, D.L.A. (2009).Proposal and Thesis Writing: An Introduction.  





Korteweg, Arthur G. (2007). The Costs of Financial Distress Across Industries. 
Unpublished working paper, Stanford University.  
Kuh, E. (1959). The validity of cross-sectionally estimated behavior equations in time 
series applications. Econometrica 27, 197-214. 
Li, H., Wang, Z., & Deng, X. (2008). Ownership, independent directors, agency costs 
and  financial distress: evidence from Chinese listed companies. Corporate 
Governance: The international journal of business in society, 8(5), 622 – 636. 
Maddala, G. S., & Wu, S. (1999). A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data 
and a new simple test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 631–652. 
Maina, L., & Ishmail, M. (2014). Capital structure and financial performance in Kenya: 
Evidence from firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. International 
Journal of Social Sciences and Entrepreneurship, 1 (11), 209-223.  
Mamo, A. Q. (2011). Applicability of Altman (1968) model in predicting financial 
distress of commercial banks in Kenya. Unpublished MBA Research Project, 
University of Nairobi. 
Marsh, P. (1982). The choice between equity and debt: An empirical study. The Journal 
of Finance, 37 (1), 121-144.  
Martin, B.B. (1998). Financial Distress in local banks in Kenya Nigeria, Uganda and 
Zambia: Causes and Implications for regulatory policy Development. Policy 
Review, 16, 173-188. 
Masdupi, E., Tasman, A. & Davista, A. (2018). The Influence of Liquidity, Leverage 
and Profitability on Financial Distress of Listed Manufacturing Companies in 





Md-Rus, R., Mohd, K.N.T., Latif, R.A. &Alassan, Z.N. (2013). Ownership Structure 
and Financial Distress. Journal of Advanced Management Science, 1(4), 363-
367. 
Mirkovic, V. & Dasic, B. & Siljkovic, B. (2013). Market Risk Management in Banks. 
Conference Paper,  RaDMI 2013, Kopaonik, Srbija. 
Mugenda, O. & Mugenda, A. (2003). Research Methods; Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches. Nairobi, KE: Acts Press. 
Muigai, R. G. & Muriithi, J. G. (2017) The Moderating Effect of Firm Size on the 
Relationship Between Capital Structure and Financial Distress of Non-Financial 
Companies Listed in Kenya. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(4), 151-158. 
Muigai, R.G. (2016). Effect of Capital Structure on Financial Distress of Fianancial 
Companies Listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange. Unpublished Doctor of 
Philosophy (Finance), Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology. 
Mundlak, Y. (1961). Empirical production function free of management bias. Journal of 
Farm Economics 43, 44-56. 
Musyoki, D., & Kadubo, A. S. (2012). The impact of credit risk management on the 
financial performance of banks in Kenya for the period 2000-2006. International 
Journal of Business and Public Management, 2(2), 72-80. 
Mutua D.M. (2015). The Effects of Credit Risk Management on the financial 
performance of Commercial banks in Kenya. Unpublished MBA project, 
University of Nairobi. 
Myers, C.S. & Brealey, R.A. (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Nerlove, M., & Balestra, P. (1996). Formulation and estimation of econometric models 





Handbook of the Theory With Applications (pp. 3-22). Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers . 
Ngunjiri, N. (2016). The Causes of Financial Distress in Kenya. Unpublished Article. 
Available in Research Gate. 
Nyaga, M. B. (2015). Quality Management and Operational Risk Management in 
Commercial Banks in Kenya.Retrieved from http://erepository.  




Nyong’o, J. (2014). The Relationship Between Credit Risk Management and Non-
Performing Loans in Commercial Banks in Kenya. Unpublished MBA project, 
University of  Nairobi 
Ochieng, O.S.P. (2018). Factors Contributing to Financial Distress in Commercial Banks 
of Kenya. The International Journal of Business Management and Technology, 2 
(5). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. (1988). Bank Failure: An Evaluation of the 
Factors Contributing to the Failure of National Banks. Washington, D.C. 
Olweny, T. & Shipho, T. M. (2011). Effects of banking sectoral factors on the profitability 
of commercial banks in Kenya. Economics and Finance Review, 1 (5), 01-30. 
Ongore, V. O. & Kusa, G. B. (2013). Determinants of financial performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya. International Journal of Economics and Financial 
Issues, 3 (1), 237-252. 
Ongore, V. O. (2013). Determinants of Financial Performance of Commercial Banks in 





Ouma., T. (2015). Effects of liquidity risk on profitability of commercial banks in Kenya. 
Unpublished thesis submitted to University of Nairobi. 
Outecheva, N. (2007). Corporate Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of Distress 
Risk. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of St Gullen,Switzerland. 
Papadogonas, T. A. (2006). The financial performance of large and small firms: 
evidence from Greece. International Journal of Financial Services Management, 
2 (1-2), 14-20.  
Prasad, K.V.N. & Ravinder, G. (2012). A CAMELS model analysis of nationalized 
banks in India. International Journal of Trade and Commerce, 1, 23-33. 
Rahman, S., Tan, L. H., Hew, O. L., & Tan, Y. S. (2004). Identifying Financial Distress 
Indicators of Selected Banks in Asia. Asian Economic Journal, 45-57. 
Ramadan, I. Z., Kilani, Q. A. & Kaddumi, T. A. (2009). Determinants of Bank 
Profitability: Evidence from Jordan. International Journal of Academic 
Research, 3(4).  
Rao, K. R. M. & Lakew, T. B. (2012). Determinants 0f Profitability of Commercial 
Banks in A Developing Country: Evidence from Ethiopia. International Journal 
of Accounting and Financial Management Research (IJAFMR), 2 (3), 1-20. 
Reddy SK (2012). Relative performance of commercial banks in India using CAMELS 
approach. Research Journal of Economics and Business Studies, 2, 38-58. 
Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.S. (2009). The Aftermath of Financial Crises. NBER 
Working Paper No. 14656. 
Said, M. C & Tumin, R (2011). The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 





Sangmi, M. & Nazir, T. (2010). Analyzing financial performance of commercial banks in 
India: Application of CAMEL model. Pakistan Journal of Commerce & Social 
Sciences, 4 (1), 40-55. 
Saunders M., Lewis P., & Thornhill, A. (2012). Research methods for business students. 
6th Ed. Pearson professional Limited. 
Shahatit, M.I. (2011). The Standard Analysis of the Application of Capital Adequacy on 
the Profitability of Commercial Banks, The Journal of Administrative Sciences, 
38(2). 
Sinkey, J. F (1975). A ZETA Analyisis of Failed Commercial Banks." Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, 35-49. 
Smith, R. (2004). Exploring the usefulness of a conceptual framework as a research tool: 
A researcher’s reflections. Issues in Educational Research, 14(2), 167-180. 
Smith, R.L. (2004). Entrepreneurial Finance. 2nd Ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley and 
Son 
Sufian, F. and Kamarudin, F. (2012). Bank-Specific and Macroeconomic Determinants 
of Profitability of Bangladesh’s Commercial Banks. Bangladesh Development 
Studies XXXV(4). 
Suka, J. N. (2012). The impact of capital adequacy on the financial performance of 
commercial banks quoted at the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Unpublished thesis 
submitted to  University of Nairobi 
Sundararajan, V. and Balino J. (1991). Banking Crises: Cases and Issues. International 
Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 







Tannar, A. A. (1990). Financial Sector Restructuring the Ghana Experience. World Bank 
Federal Reserve Board and Bank of Ghana Seminar, Accra. 
Thornton, H. (1802) An Enquiry into the Nature and effects of the Paper Credit of Great 
Britain (ed. with an Introduction by F. A. von Hayek) London, George Allen and 
Uniwin. 
Ugoani, J.N.N. (2016). Non-performing Loans Portfolio and its effects on Bank 
Profitability in Nigeria. Independent Journal of Managemnt and Production,7,2. 
Wachira, G. D. (2010). “Relationship Between Financial Performance and Camel 





Waweru, N. & Kalani, V. M. (2010). Commercial Banking Crises in Kenya: Causes and 
Remedies. African Journal of Accounting, Economics, Finance and Banking 
Research, 4,(4). 
Whitaker Richard B., (1999), The stages of financial distress. Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 23(2), 123 – 132.  
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data. MIT 
Press, Massachusetts. 
World Bank. (1984). “The World Bank Economic Memorandum on Argentina” 
Washington. 
Wruck, K. (1990), “Financial Distress: Reorganization and Organization Efficiency’’ in 





Wulandari, Y., Musdholifah. and Kusairi, S. (2017). The Impact of Macroeconomic and 
Internal Factors on Banking Distress. International Journal of Economics and 
Financial Issues, 7(3), 429-436. 
Yirgu, T. (2017). The Determinants of Financial Distress: Empirical Evidence from 







Appendix I: Description of Panel Data Approach and Diagnostic Tests 
1.0 Description of the Panel Data Approach  
One important decision when using a panel data approach regards which type of panel 
model to use: pooling, fixed effects and random effects.  
Essentially, there have been two approaches to creating panel data, combining cross 
section with time series data. First, the Least square dummy variables estimation has 
been suggested to account for constant effects associated with both the time and cross-
sectional units. The use of dummy variables is an attempt to specify a model with an 
error term that indeed has zero mean, as required from assumptions of classical linear 
regression. The second approach is to recognize possible serial correlations in the error 
terms and account for these to increase the asymptotic efficiency of the estimates of the 
causal parameters. 
The pooled OLS estimators used with panel data are unbiased under fulfilled 
assumptions of model linearity, independence, strict exogeneity and unrelated effects in 
small samples. Additionally, assuming and normally distributed idiosyncratic and 
individual specific errors, it is normally distributed in small samples.  
1.1 Fixed Effects Model 
According to Baltagi (2005), the fixed effects (FE) least squares, also known as least 
squares dummy variables (LSDV), suffers from a large loss of degrees of freedom. 
Having too many dummies in the model may aggravate the problem of multicollinearity 
among the regressors and it is common to see most variables being eliminate because of 
this. In addition, this FE estimator cannot estimate the effect of any time-invariant 
variable like sex, race, religion, schooling or union participation. In addition to LSDV 
Estimation, the fixed effects model can also be estimated using the within estimation 





(or time period) means. The two strategies produce the identical parameter estimates of 
regressors (non-dummy independent variables). 
The LSDV model takes the basic form below: 
 
Where denotes the unobservable individual-specific effect and  denotes the 
remainder disturbance. This fixed effects (FE) least squares, also known as least squares 
dummy variables (LSDV), suffers from a large loss of degrees of freedom. We are 
estimating (N − 1) extra parameters, and too many dummies may aggravate the problem 
of multicollinearity among the regressors. If N is large, 
LSDV will include too many individual dummies and therefore it becomes optimal to 
wipe out these fixed effects. This is done using  
The within estimation takes the form below: 
 
Where  is the mean of dependent variable (DV) of individual (group),  represent the 
means of independent variables (IVs) of group i,  is the mean of errors of group i. As 
noted from the above time-invariant variables are wiped out by the within  
transformation, the deviations from means transformation. Alternative transformations 
used to wipe out the individual effects have been suggested, including the between 
transformation which averages values of all cross sections over time and runs the 






Early applications of this error components in economics include (Kuh, 1959) on 
investment and Mundlak (1961). 
The Fixed eff ects estimator of β is unbiased under assumptions of model linearity, 
independence, strict exogeneity and no perfect collinearity in small samples. Assuming 
no serial correlation and normally distributed idiosyncratic errors, it is normally 
distributed in small samples. If the model is the true model, then Least squares dummy 
variable estimation provides the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) as long as  is 
the standard classical disturbance with mean 0 and variance–covariance matrix . In 
this case, the  are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder 
disturbances  stochastic with independent and identically distributed IID (0, ) 
1.2 Random Effects Model 
There are too many parameters in the fixed effects model and this causes loss of degrees 
of freedom can be avoided if the  can be assumed random. In this case  IID (0, ) 
and  IID (0, ) and the  are independent of the  In addition, it is also taken 
that there is no endogeneity inherent in the model (i.e. the  are independent of  and 
). According to Baltagi (2005), the random effects model is an appropriate 





individuals randomly from a large population. In this case, N is usually large and using a 
fixed effects model would lead to an enormous loss of degrees of freedom.  
Nerlove & Balestra (1996) emphasize that the population “consists not of an infinity of 
individuals, in general, but of an infinity of decisions” that each individual might make. 
This view is consistent with a random effects specification. In addition, they suggest that 
under the random effects model, GLS based on the true variance components is BLUE, 
and all the feasible GLS estimators considered are asymptotically efficient as either N or 
T →∞.  The Random Effects GLS estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed under fulfilled assumptions of model linearity, independence, strict 
exogeneity, no autocorrelation, unrelated effects and constant variance of the individual 
specific eff ect. The estimator also has good small sample properties. 
We use the F-Test to investigate the presence of pooling versus fixed effects, the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test to investigate the presence of pooling 
versus random effects and Hausman Test to investigate the presence of random effects 
versus fixed effects. These are described in detail below: 
2.0 Diagnostic Tests 
2.1 Unit Root Tests 
Several unit root tests applied in the time series literature have been extended to panel 
data. We use the Fisher Type unit root tests which allows for unbalanced panels. 
Maddala & Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) proposed a Fisher-type test. The unit root test 
checks for non-stationarity of the variables used in the model. The Fisher-type test uses 
p-values from unit root tests for each cross-section i. The formula of the test looks as 






This combines the p-values from unit root tests for each cross-section i to test for unit 
root in panel data. Note that  has a  distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom. The null hypothesis of the Fisher Type Unit Root test is that all panels have 
unit root (non-stationary) versus the alternative hypothesis that the panels do not have 
unit root (they are stationary). The Fisher Type Unit Root tests provides four test 
statistics used to evaluate the rejection of the null, or failure to reject the null. the Fisher 
test has the advantage over the IPS (Im Pesaran Shin) test in that it does not require a 
balanced panel. The disadvantage is 
that the p-values have to be derived by Monte Carlo simulations. Maddala and Wu 
(1999) find that the Fisher test with bootstrap-based critical values performs the best and 
is the preferred choice for testing nonstationary as the null. 
2.2 F-Test: Pooled vs Fixed Effects 
The question of whether to pool the data or not naturally arises with panel data. The 
restricted model is the pooled model and it represents a behavioral equation with the 
same parameters over time and across cross-sections. The unrestricted model, however, 
is the same behavioural equation but with different parameters across time or across 
cross-sections (Baltagi (2005)). One of the earliest studies around testing for poolability 
includes Balestra & Nerlove (1966) considered a dynamic demand equation for natural 
gas across 36 states over six years. Poolability (or lack of) comes down to the question 
of whether the parameters of this demand equation vary from one year to the other over 






Under a pooled regression, it is held that the fixed effects (individual specific effects) are 
jointly insignificant. Given the model below: 
 
It is held that  
In testing for the presence of pooled vs fixed effects, this is the null hypothesis. This 
hypothesis is tested by an F test, which is based on loss of goodness-of-fit. This is a 
simple Chow test with the restricted residual sums of squares (RRSS) being that of the 
pooled OLS model and the unrestricted residual sums of squares (URSS) being that of 
the LSDV (fixed effects) regression. If the null hypothesis of the F-test is rejected, a 
fixed effect model is favored over OLS. 
2.3 Pooled vs Random Effects: The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
Test  
For the random two-way error component model, Breusch & Pagan (1980) derived a 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to test . The null hypothesis in the LM 
test is that variances across entities is zero. This is, no significant difference across units 
(i.e. no panel effect). If the null hypothesis of the LM test is rejected, a random effect 
model is better than the pooled OLS. This LM test requires only OLS residuals and is 
easy to compute. This may explain its popularity (Baltagi, 2005) 
2.4 Hausman Test 
A critical assumption in the error component regression model is that . 





which are unobserved and may be correlated with the . In the case of the random 
effects model, the GLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent if . 
However, when using the fixed effects model, the Within transformation wipes out the 
individual specific effects and leaves the Within estimator is unbiased and 
consistent. 
Hausman (1978) suggests comparing  and  both of which are consistent 
under the null hypothesis that , but which will have different probability 
limits if H0 is not true. In fact,  is consistent whether H0 is true or not, while   
is BLUE, consistent and asymptotically efficient under H0, but is inconsistent when H0 
is false. Hausman Test therefore tests the null hypothesis that the extra 
orthogonality conditions imposed by the random effects estimator are valid, therefore 
that the Random Effects model provides consistent estimates. The fixed effects 
estimator, which does not impose those conditions, is consistent regardless of 
the independence of the individual effects. The fixed effects estimates are inefficient if 
that assumption of independence is warranted. The random effects estimator is efficient 
under the assumption of independence, but inconsistent otherwise.  
We conduct the Hausman test when both hypotheses of the F-test and LM test are all 
rejected. We run both the Fixed Effects Model and the Random Effects Model and 
implement the Hausman test to choose which model gives consistent estimates 
More recently, Arellano (1993) provided an alternative variable addition test to the 







2.5 Testing for Autocorrelation 
Serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors and causes the 
results to be less efficient. A number of tests, including one by Baltagi-Wu (1999). Many 
of these tests make specific assumptions about the nature of the individual eff ects or test 
for the individual-level eff ects jointly. However, Wooldridge’s test by Wooldridge 
(2002) is very attractive because it requires fewer assumptions and is easier to 
implement. We use this to tests for the within panel correlation of the residuals. 
To adjust for any autocorrelation detected in the residuals, we use robust standard errors 






Appendix II: Diagnostic Tests for Bank Specific Variables 
1) Unit Root Tests 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests Results for the Bank Specific Variables 
Indicator Measure 
Fisher Type test results 
with Drift Term 
Financial Distress Z-Score P value: 0.0000 
Leverage Total Debt/Total Liabilities P value: 0.0000 
Overly Aggressive Activity 1 Net Loans/Deposits P value: 0.0000 
Overly Aggressive Activity 2 Total Fixed Assets/Total Assets P value: 0.0000 
Insider Lending Total Insider Loans & Advances/Core Capital P value: 0.0000 
Capital Adequacy 1 Total Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets P value: 0.0000 
Capital Adequacy 2 Core Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets P value: 0.0000 
Credit Risk & Asset Quality (Gross NPL’s) /Gross Loans  P value: 0.0039 
Management Efficiency  Operating Expenses/Revenues P value: 0.0000 
Earnings ROA P value: 0.0000 
Liquidity 
Net Liquid Assets/Total deposits & Short-Term 
Libs 
P value: 0.0000 
Market Risk Relative Gap/Total Assets P value: 0.0000 
Size Logarithm of Total Assets P value: 0.0000 
The unit root test results are presented in the table above. The Fisher-Type test which 
allows for imbalanced data is used. The test is augmented with a drift term. The results 
indicate that all the variables used in the study are stationary (no unit root). This is 
assessed at a 95% confidence interval (5% level of significance). 
2) F-Test: Pooled vs Fixed Effects 
The study estimates an  F-Test to deterring the significance of the fixed effects present in 
the data set. The results are shown below: 





F (44, 231) =    11.66   
Prob > F = 0.0000 
The results above support a rejection of the null hypothesis that fixed effects are all 
jointly insignificant. Therefore, a fixed effect model is better than a Pooled OLS model 
3) The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test: Pooled vs Random 
Effects:  
The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities is zero. This is, no 
significant difference across units (i.e. no panel effect). If the null hypothesis of the LM 
test is rejected, a random effect model is better than the pooled OLS. 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test 
Ho: No significant difference across units (i.e. no panel effect) 
Test:   Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) =   179.25 
Prob > chibar2 (p-value) =  0.0000 
The test results indicate that for model 1 the null hypothesis is rejected, given the p-value of 
0.0000. Random Effects Model is therefore better than a Pooled OLS model 
4) Hausman Test 
From the Lagrange Multiplier test (random effects) and the Chow Test (fixed effects) 
provided above, the results indicate that Pooled OLS is a sub-optimal method of analysis 
for the data set, given the existence of both fixed and random effects. In this case, a 
Hausman test becomes relevant in selecting between the Fixed Effects model and a 
Random Effects model. The Hausman Test tests the null hypothesis that the extra 
orthogonality conditions imposed by the random effects estimator are valid, therefore 






Hausman Test:  
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(12) statistic = 24.10 
Prob>chi2 (p-value) = 0.0197 
The p-value indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence interval. 
This means that a Fixed Effects Model is use for Model Specification 1 
5) Testing for Autocorrelation 
The results from the Wooldridge Test are shown below 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation 
F (1, 42) = 9.030 
Prob > F (p-value) = 0.0045 
The p-value indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of “no autocorrelation in the 
residuals”. A correction for this is made by using robust estimation of the standard errors 






Appendix III: Diagnostic Tests for Bank Spreads 
1) Unit Root Tests 
Table 2: Unit Root Test Results for Spread Variables 
Indicator Measure 
Fisher Type test 
results 
Financial Distress Spread -- Total Debt/Total Liabilities P value: 0.0000 
Leverage Spread -- Net Loans/Deposits P value: 0.0000 
Overly Aggressive Activity 
1 
Spread -- Total Fixed Assets/Total Assets P value: 0.0000 
Overly Aggressive Activity 
2 
Spread -- Total Insider Loans & Advances/Core Capital P value: 0.0000 
Insider Lending Spread -- Total Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets P value: 0.0000 
Capital Adequacy 1 Spread -- Core Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets P value: 0.0000 
Capital Adequacy 2 Spread -- (Gross NPL’s) /Gross Loans  P value: 0.0000 
Credit Risk & Asset Quality Spread -- Operating Expenses/Revenues P value: 0.0000 
Management Efficiency  Spread -- ROA P value: 0.0000 
Earnings Spread -- Net Liquid Assets/ Total deposits & Short-Term Libs P value: 0.0000 
Liquidity Spread -- Relative Gap/Total Assets P value: 0.0000 
Market Risk Spread -- Total Debt/Total Liabilities P value: 0.0000 
Size Spread – Logarithm of Assets P value: 0.0000 
The unit root test results for the spread variables are presented in the table above. The Fisher-
Type test which allows for imbalanced data is used. The test is augmented with a drift term. The 
p-values indicate that all the spread variables used in the study are stationary (no unit root). This 
is assessed at a 95% confidence interval (5% level of significance). 
2) F-Test: Pooled vs Fixed Effects 
The study estimates a Chow Test to deterring the significance of the fixed effects present 
in the data set. The results are shown below: 
F test that all fixed effects = 0:  
F (44, 231) = 10.02 





The results above support a rejection of the null hypothesis that fixed effects are all jointly 
insignificant. Therefore, a fixed effect model is better than a Pooled OLS model for the second 
model specification. 
3) Pooled vs Random Effects: The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
Test  
The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities is zero. This is, no significant 
difference across units (i.e. no panel effect). If the null hypothesis of the LM test is rejected, a 
random effect model is better than the pooled OLS. 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test 
Ho: No significant difference across units (i.e. no panel effect) 
Test: Var(u) = 0 
chibar2 (01) = 109.46 
Prob > chibar2 (p-value) = 0.0000 
The test results indicate that for model 2 the null hypothesis is rejected, given the p-value of 
0.0000. Random Effects Model is therefore better than a Pooled OLS model 
4) Hausman Test 
From the Lagrange Multiplier test (for random effects) and the Chow Test (for fixed 
effects) provided above, the results indicate that Pooled OLS is a sub-optimal method of 
analysis for the data set, given the existence of both fixed and random effects. In this 
case, a Hausman test becomes relevant in selecting between the Fixed Effects model and 
a Random Effects model. The Hausman Test tests the null hypothesis that the extra 
orthogonality conditions imposed by the random effects estimator are valid, therefore 
that the Random Effects model provides consistent estimates.  
However, on estimation of the Hausman Test, a negative chi-squared statistic is 
provided, which is an indication that the second model fitted on the spread data fails to 





An alternative test is therefore used to select between the Random Effects and Fixed 
Effects Model. The Sargan-Hansen Test is a test of overidentifying restrictions where 
the null hypothesis is that the restrictions placed on the data are valid. In this case, the 
restriction is the assumption placed by the Random Effects model of no endogeneity 
inherent in the model (i.e. the  are independent of  and ). The results from this 
test are reported after a standard random effects model estimation. 
The results of this test are presented below: 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects 
Cross-section time-series model: 
Sargan-Hansen statistic = 91.870  
Prob>chi2 (p-value) = 0.0197 
The p-value indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence interval. 
This means that the restriction placed by the Random Effects model is not valid and 
therefore, a Fixed Effects Model is used for Model Specification 2. 
5) Testing for Autocorrelation 
The results from the Wooldridge Test are shown below 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation 
F (1, 42) = 13.422 
Prob > F (p-value) = 0.0007 
The p-value indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of “no autocorrelation in the 
residuals”. A correction for this is made by using robust estimation of the standard errors 





Appendix IV: Diagnostic Tests for Macro-economic Variables 
1) Unit Root Tests 
Table 3: Unit Root Test Results for Macroeconomic Variables 
Variable Measure Fisher Type Test Result 
Economic Growth GDP Growth P value: 0.0000 
Central Bank Rate CBR P value: 0.0000 
Interbank Activity Annual Interbank Volumes/Aggregate Volumes P value: 0.0000 
The unit root test results are presented in the table above. The Fisher-Type test which 
allows for imbalanced data is used. The test is augmented with a drift term. The results 
indicate that the macro-economic variables used in the study are stationary (no unit 
root). 
 
2) F-Test: Pooled vs Fixed Effects 
The study estimates a Chow Test to deterring the significance of the fixed effects present 
in the data set. The results are shown below: 
F test that all fixed effects = 0:  
F (44, 240) =    14.73 
Prob > F (p-value) = 0.0000 
The results above support a rejection of the null hypothesis that fixed effects are all jointly 






3) Pooled vs Random Effects: The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
Test  
The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities is zero. This is, no significant 
difference across units (i.e. no panel effect). If the null hypothesis of the LM test is rejected, a 
random effect model is better than the pooled OLS. 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test 
Ho: No significant difference across units (i.e. no panel effect) 
Test: Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) = 326.22 
Prob > chibar2 (p-value) =   0.0000 
The test results indicate that for model 3 the null hypothesis is rejected, given the p-value of 
0.0000. Random Effects Model is therefore better than a Pooled OLS model 
4) Hausman Test 
From the Lagrange Multiplier test (for random effects) and the Chow Test (for fixed 
effects) provided above, the results indicate that Pooled OLS is a sub-optimal method of 
analysis for the data set, given the existence of both fixed and random effects. In this 
case, a Hausman test becomes relevant in selecting between the Fixed Effects model and 
a Random Effects model. The Hausman Test tests the null hypothesis that the extra 
orthogonality conditions imposed by the random effects estimator are valid, therefore 
that the Random Effects model provides consistent estimates.  
However, on estimation of the Hausman Test, a negative chi-squared statistic is 
provided, which is an indication that the second model fitted on the spread data fails to 
meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. 
An alternative test is therefore used to select between the Random Effects and Fixed 
Effects Model. The Sargan-Hansen Test is a test of overidentifying restrictions where 





restriction is the assumption placed by the Random Effects model of no endogeneity 
inherent in the model (i.e. the  are independent of  and ). The results from this 
test are reported after a standard random effects model estimation. 
The results of this test are presented below: 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects 
Cross-section time-series model: 
Sargan-Hansen statistic = 7.389 
P-value = 0.0605 
The p-value of 0.0605 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95% 
confidence interval. This means that the restriction placed by the Random Effects model 
is valid and therefore, a Random Effects Model is used for Model Specification 3. 
5) Testing for Autocorrelation 
The results from the Wooldridge Test are shown below 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation 
F (1, 42) = 15.269 
Prob > F (p-value) = 0.0003 
The p-value indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of “no autocorrelation in the 
residuals”. A correction for this is made by using robust estimation of the standard errors 












Appendix VI: List of Commercial Banks in Kenya as at the year 2012 
Name of Commercial Bank 
1 Equity Bank Ltd  
2 Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd  
3 Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd  
4 Standard Chartered Bank (K) Ltd  
5 Cooperative Bank of Kenya Ltd  
6 Citibank N.A. 
7 I&M Bank Ltd  
8 CFC Stanbic Bank Ltd  
9 Diamond Trust Bank Ltd  
10 NIC Bank Ltd  
11 Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd  
12 Imperial Bank Ltd  
13 Baroda Bank Ltd  
14 Chase Bank Ltd  





16 National Bank of Kenya Ltd  
17 Family Bank Ltd  
18 Bank of Africa (K) Ltd  
19 Bank of India  
20 African Banking Corporation Ltd  
21 Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd  
22 Habib Bank Ltd  
23 Habib A.G. Zurich  
24 Gulf African Bank (K) Ltd  
25 Fina Bank Ltd  
26 Trans-National Bank Ltd  
27 K-Rep Bank Ltd  
28 First Community Bank Ltd  
29 Guardian Bank Ltd  
30 Giro Commercial Bank Ltd  
31 Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd  
32 Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd  





34 Fidelity Commercial Bank Ltd  
35 Paramount Universal Bank Ltd  
36 Credit Bank Ltd  
37 Jamii Bora Bank Ltd  
38 Middle East Bank (K) Ltd  
39 Housing Fin. Co. of Kenya Ltd 
40 Dubai Bank Ltd  
41 UBA Bank (K) Ltd  
42 Equatorial Commercial Bank Ltd  
43 Ecobank Kenya Ltd 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya 
